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Counter-Restitution for Monetary Remedies 
in Equity 
George P. Roach∗ 
Abstract 
Equitable remedies are growing in importance as the remedies of 
choice for intellectual property and federal agency claims.  The measure of 
monetary remedies in equity is founded in trust law, which provides that 
even a disloyal trustee is entitled to indemnity for expenses that benefit the 
trust.  Based on this principle and case law on measuring intellectual 
property remedies, a defendant to a claim for a monetary remedy in equity 
has the opportunity to prove that the unjust enrichment established by the 
plaintiff should be reduced for unrelated revenues or beneficial expenses.   
Opponents of this right justify revenue disgorgement by the prejudicial 
nature of the defendant’s actions; an inexplicable distinction between 
"restitution" and "disgorgement"; and the disputed authority of a court in 
equity to exact punitive remedies.  The right to prove counter-restitution 
represents the traditional law in equity and when federal agencies seek 
gross disgorgement, they exceed the limited jurisdiction that the United 
States Supreme Court allows for their ancillary claims to injunctive relief. 
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I.  Introduction 
Within the North Texas legal community, the tale of one litigator’s 
speech to a statewide American Medical Association convention is often 
repeated with the understatement that makes Texas famous.  Purportedly, 
the lawyer’s keynote speech began by reminding the audience that in the 
eighteenth century, lawyers were drafting the Declaration of Independence 
and United States Constitution while doctors were still applying leeches or 
otherwise bleeding their patients.  On reflection, one wonders if a doctor 
might now return the favor at an American Bar Association convention and 
ask how well American lawyers have kept pace with the progress that 
medicine has achieved in the last 200 years. 
Monetary remedies in equity offer substantial promise for current and 
future corporate litigation.  Variously known as restitution, unjust 
enrichment or disgorgement, they are measured similarly for intentional or 
conscious unjust acts, as they are all based on an accounting in equity.  
They are conceptually simple, largely based on ex post data (as opposed to 
ex ante projections) and can reduce the discovery burden on the plaintiff.  
Monetary remedies in equity sometimes offer a "charming" result1 or more 
complete relief2 for claims such as the misappropriation of intangible 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Andrew Kull, Restitution’s Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 32 (2003) 
(stating that "as retributive justice it has an unmistakable charm"). 
 2. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 437 (Jairus W. Perry ed., 12th ed. 1877) ("We 
have gone over the principal grounds upon which Courts of Equity grant relief in matters of 
accident, mistake and fraud.").  Story further stated, "The relief . . . is more complete, 
adequate, and perfect, inasmuch as it adapts itself to the special circumstances of each 
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property because many states still do not recognize a claim for conversion 
of intangible property.3  For some causes in action, equitable remedies may 
therefore provide the only real choice relating to intangible assets, like 
domain names,4 negative information (i.e., information on unsuccessful or 
failed experiments),5 computer files,6 confidential information,7 and such 
exotics as DNA patterns or virtual assets.8  Apparently, remedies in equity 
also offer advantages to Congress, which has shown a marked preference 
for enacting vague references to injunctive relief and other equitable 
remedies to support or enforce federal agency mandates.9 
With such a view of the future, it seems contradictory to emphasize the 
need to improve our understanding of the historical development of existing 
monetary remedies in equity.  Even though counter-restitution is an 
essential element of these remedies, its origins and links to trust and agency 
law are either forgotten or overlooked.  This Article will show that the 
plaintiff’s counter-restitution,10 offsetting credit for revenue apportionment 
and the defendant’s beneficial expenses, is an essential consideration to 
                                                                                                                 
particular case; adjusting all cross equities; and bringing all the parties in interest before the 
court so as to prevent multiplicity of suits and interminable litigation."  Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Emke v. Compana, L.L.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70826, at *9 (N.D. 
Tex. 2007) (stating that, in Texas, the law precludes any conversion claim unless it concerns 
physical property). 
 4. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2003) (ruling that an 
internet domain name is intangible property that could serve as the basis for a conversion 
claim); Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037–39 (9th Cir. 2003) (asking the California 
Supreme Court whether an internet domain name is property that can be converted under 
California tort law). 
 5. See Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 709–10 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(providing an example of an unjust enrichment case concerning negative information). 
 6. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006) ("Any person 
who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil 
action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other 
equitable relief."). 
 7. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27–28 (1987) (characterizing breach 
of the common law duty to protect employer’s confidential information as unjust 
enrichment). 
 8. Virtual assets are prizes, distinctions, or assets found in on-line games or artificial 
environments.  See generally Andrea Vanina Arias, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Swords 
and Armor:  Regulating the Theft of Virtual Goods, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301 (2008). 
 9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. c 
(2011) (stating that one of the questions courts must answer is whether a particular remedy is 
available under a statute authorizing "equitable relief"). 
 10. While counter-restitution is also a significant issue in relation to in-kind rescission 
and specific restitution, these facets of the topic are not addressed directly in the Article. 
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measure the defendant’s unjust enrichment.11  The Restatement (First) of 
Restitution12 (First Restatement) and Restatement (Third) of Restitution & 
Unjust Enrichment13 (Third Restatement) address the issue of counter-
restitution by name as a part of its discussion of rescission and by substance 
in other sections, but neither Restatement clearly states that the defendant in 
equity has a right to try to prove that the unjust enrichment to the defendant 
evidenced by the plaintiff should be adjusted.  This Article presents 
sufficient support from existing case law to recognize that existing practice 
justifies such a right with limited exceptions and conditions. 
The Restatements’ rationale and standards for measuring counter-
restitution are unclear and at times contradictory.  United States Supreme 
Court opinions handed down in the development of patent and copyright 
law in the nineteenth century show that counter-restitution should be 
considered from the construct of deeming the defendant a "quasi-trustee."  
Similarly, the quasi-trustee standard applied trust law’s indemnity standard 
to measure counter-restitution.14  This Article will show that, while the 
Restatements do not generally ignore the influence of trust or agency law 
on the law of restitution, they generally appear reluctant to apply the 
indemnity standard in the analysis and measure of unjust enrichment and 
counter-restitution.  The indemnity standard of evaluating trustee expenses 
by their benefit to the trust (even for unauthorized expenses) is not applied 
widely in the First Restatement or Third Restatement. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. The issue of establishing apportionment is sufficiently important to warrant 
consideration, but it will not be included in this analysis.  See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn 
Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) ("The purpose is to provide just compensation for 
the wrong, not to impose a penalty by giving to the copyright proprietor profits which are 
not attributable to the infringement."); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & 
Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 615–16 (1912) (stating the general proposition that "the plaintiff 
must prove its case and carry the burden imposed by law upon every person seeking to 
recover money or property from another"); Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) 
(stating that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence of damages suffered, and the 
Court awarded only nominal damages); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. b (2011) ("There is no unjust enrichment (and no claim by the rule of 
§ 42) unless the defendant has obtained a benefit in violation of the claimant’s right to 
exclude others from the interests in question.").  See generally Caprice L. Roberts, The Case 
for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
653 (2010). 
 12. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (1937). 
 13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011). 
 14. See Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 148 (1881) (stating that 
court of equity will administer relief by awarding compensation computed and measured by 
the same rule that courts of equity apply to the case of a trustee who has wrongfully used the 
trust property for his own advantage). 
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The last section of the Article analyzes gross disgorgement remedies 
(monetary remedies without allowance for counter-restitution) awarded in 
federal agency case law, especially claims by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA), that will 
offer a challenge for the general applicability and relevance of the 
Restatements.  The Supreme Court has now repeatedly held that remedies 
in equity must be limited to traditional remedies and designated the 
Restatements authoritative guides for distinguishing traditional remedies in 
equity.15  Seemingly, many of the agency opinions conflict with the 
Restatements and the Supreme Court with impunity.  The awards to the 
FTC and the FDA of gross disgorgement do not resemble traditional 
monetary remedies in equity in other areas of the law or even for other 
federal agencies.  The Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit established that no federal court has the jurisdiction to make 
such awards.16 
II.  Anti-Netting Doctrine as a Genetic Marker for Monetary Remedies 
in Equity 
The anti-netting doctrine, which is used to measure unjust enrichment, 
has three characteristics that highlight some key points in this Article.  First, 
it reveals the breadth of corporate or business litigation influenced by 
monetary remedies in equity.17  Second, it is generally applied without any 
acknowledgement of its origin or rationale.18  Third, it exemplifies the 
influence of trust law on the law of restitution and shows how remedies in 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 
(2002) ("Rarely will there be need for any more ‘antiquarian inquiry’ . . . than consulting, as 
we have done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, 
which make the answer clear."). 
 16. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S 356, 362 (2006) (stating that 
not all relief under restitution is permitted in equity); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. 
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (discussing the powers of federal courts 
under the Judiciary Act’s grant of jurisdiction over "all . . . suits in equity"); Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117–20 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing whether 
disgorgement as a remedy survives Grupo as a remedy available at chancery in 1789). 
 17. See George P. Roach, Counting the Beans:  Unjust Enrichment and the 
Defendant’s Overhead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 483, 523–26 (2008) (discussing the anti-
netting doctrine). 
 18. Id. 
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equity can be measured more appropriately once the rationale is 
determined.19 
It is otherwise unknown in the measure of corporate damages for a 
plaintiff to be allowed to choose which results to include in the remedy.  
Under the anti-netting doctrine, separate infringements that produce 
negative results need not be accumulated with the profits of the infringer in 
the measure of the defendant’s unjust enrichment.  The interpretation of this 
anti-netting rule can have a large impact on a monetary award, especially in 
cases relating to trading operations for stocks and commodities.  In a case 
from the Carter Administration, the difference in unjust enrichment 
between applying the rule or not resulted in a difference of more than $500 
million in claims made to enforce the pricing differential between old oil 
and new oil.20 
This obscure doctrine has been applied in opinions relating to fiduciary 
claims,21 patents,22 copyrights,23 trademarks,24 trade secrets,25 and federal 
agency claims.26  The doctrine, therefore, manifests the commonality of 
measuring unjust enrichment across a wide range of substantive law.  
Technically, the plaintiff is entitled to deem each infringing unit of 
production as a separate transaction.27  The doctrine has been applied to 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. 
 20. United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040, 1062–63 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986). 
 21. See King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 91 (1869). 
 22. See Crosby Steam-Gage & Valve Co. v. Consol. Safety Valve Co., 141 U.S. 441, 
457 (1891). 
 23. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1939), 
aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
 24. See, e.g., Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. v. Pro-Tech Power Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 834, 
856 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("Given that the calculations of damages rests on equitable 
considerations, the Court will not allow Pro-Tech to offset the profits it made in 1995, 1995 
[sic], 1997, and 1998 by its losses in 1993 and 1996."). 
 25. See Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. Am. Mktg. Corp., 139 A.2d 281, 286 (N.J. 1958). 
 26. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 
102 (2d Cir. 1978).  
 27. See Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 458 (1936), 
superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778 ("The owner of 
the patent, in holding the infringers to an accounting, is not confined to all or nothing.  There 
may be an acceptance of transactions resulting in a gain with a rejection of transactions 
resulting in a loss."). 
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segregate the defendant’s losses as distinguished by year,28 individual retail 
outlet,29 and separate or experimental product lines.30 
Most explanations for this doctrine fail to explain why the plaintiff 
should be allowed such discretion:  "The owner of the patent, in holding the 
infringers to an accounting, is not confined to all or nothing.  There may be 
an acceptance of transactions resulting in a gain with a rejection of 
transactions resulting in a loss."31  Even though the courts have repeatedly 
restricted a defendant’s ability to offset the loss of one independent 
infringement with the profit of a separate infringement, none have cited any 
fundamental rationale other than the fact that the plaintiff and defendant are 
not partners.32 
Only one such case actually cited Section 213 of the Restatement of 
Trusts,33 which offers the missing explanation:  The doctrine comes from 
claims against an agent for unauthorized investments.34  The principal is 
entitled to the greater of the principle invested or the investment’s market 
value for each individual investment, not for the group of investments as a 
whole.35  An authority on trust law, Professor Charles Rounds explains the 
doctrine as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing profits and losses on an 
annual basis). 
 29. Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 54–55; Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781–82 
(11th Cir. 1988).  
 30. Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Steinman, 466 F. Supp. 560, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
 31. Duplate Corp., 298 U.S. at 458; see also Burger King Corp., 855 F.2d at 781 ("An 
accounting for profits has been determined by this Court to further the congressional purpose 
by making infringement unprofitable, and is justified because it deprives the defendant of 
unjust enrichment and provides a deterrent to similar activity in the future."); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS § 37 cmt. d (1995) (discussing 
recoverable profits). 
 32. See, e.g., Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Consol. Safety Valve Co., 141 U.S. 
441, 451 (1891); Duplate Corp., 298 U.S. at 458.  But see Sutton, 795 F.2d at 1062; Burger 
King Corp., 855 F.2d at 781–82 (stating that holdover franchisee could not set off losses 
from some restaurants against profits from others, but was permitted to offset one year’s 
losses against another year’s gains from the same restaurant); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. d. (1995) (discussing recoverable profits). 
 33. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d 
Cir. 1978). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 213 (1992) ("A trustee who is liable for a 
loss caused by a breach of trust may not reduce the amount of the liability by deducting the 
amount of a profit that accrued through another and distinct breach of trust . . . .").  
 35. See King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 91 (1869) ("The rule is perfectly well settled, that 
a cestui que trust is at liberty to elect to approve an unauthorized investment, and enjoy its 
profits, or to reject it at his option . . . .").  
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If the breaches of trust, however, are not separate and distinct, the 
trustee is accountable only for the net gain or chargeable only with the 
net loss resulting therefrom.  Without the anti-netting rule, a trustee 
under certain circumstances might be inclined to commit multiple 
breaches of trust:  "For example, the trustee whose misconduct has 
caused a loss may take improper risks in pursuit of extra profits if those 
profits may serve to eliminate or reduce the amount of expected 
surcharge."36  
Given this clarification (i.e., that courts in equity want to discourage 
trustees from risking the principal’s assets to erase the trustee’s losses), the 
doctrine may have less applicability than initially indicated by the 
observation that the plaintiff and defendant are not partners.  The doctrine 
may be less applicable to cases in which the separate infringements occur 
simultaneously and therefore do not lend themselves to sequential risk.  The 
Third Restatement states the rule correctly and offers supporting citations 
without referring to Section 213 of the Restatement of Trusts.37 
Despite the common heritage of monetary remedies in fiduciary, 
intellectual property (IP) and federal agency law, little attention is given to 
such commonality in measurement.  Some mention is made of the 
compatibility of measuring remedies in IP, but little between securities and 
IP claims.38  At a minimum, a greater acknowledgement of commonality 
would improve our understanding of the underlying rationale. 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Relief for IP Rights Infringement is Primarily Equitable:  
How American Legal Education Is Short-Changing the 21st Century Corporate Litigator, 26 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 313, 350 (2010) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 213 (1990)). 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. j 
(2011) ("Profits and losses on the wrongdoer’s investments will be treated separately so long 
as the transaction may be distinguished, so the threshold questions—is this one transaction 
or a series of separate transactions?—is likely to be ‘outcome determinative.’"); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION:  FOLLOWING PROPERTY INTO ITS PRODUCT § 202 
cmt. i (1937) (addressing successive transactions); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE 
TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 865 (rev. 2d ed. 1995) (discussing 
the use of equitable liens on the trust res or its substitute, which is the product of the 
trustee’s wrongful conduct); 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 508 
(William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1989) (stating that, with respect to conscious 
wrongdoers, beneficiaries can enforce an equitable lien upon the trust res or its substitute to 
secure their claim against the trustee for damages arising from a breach of trust). 
 38. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., 738 F. Supp. 88, 95 
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Even where Congress has expressly provided a disgorgement remedy in 
a statutory context, as in the area of trademark infringement, it has provided that a violator is 
entitled to set off all proven costs or deductions against the profits accruing from his 
violation."). 
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III.  Monetary Remedies in Nineteenth Century IP Case Opinions 
Congress passed several significant statutes in the nineteenth century 
regarding patents, copyrights and design patents, but none specified how 
the defendant’s unjust enrichment should be measured.  Congress enacted 
statutory jurisdiction for injunctive relief39 and relied on the traditional 
operation of an accounting in equity to measure monetary remedies.40  In 
the twentieth century, Congress passed additional statutes that provided 
further clarification, but they did not alter the actual measure of revenues 
and expenses.41  The few statutory provisions that peripherally addressed 
measurement issues largely codified the existing practice in the nineteenth 
century.  However, Congress overruled the common law in 194642 by 
withdrawing unjust enrichment as a remedy for violations of utility patents, 
and Congress reversed Garretson v. Clark43 as that opinion related to 
design patents.44  Therefore, the measure of unjust enrichment for claims 
regarding patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets is derived 
almost exclusively from traditional principles for accounting in equity.45 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 193 (1881) ("‘[The Patent 
Act of July 4, 1836] does not enlarge or alter the powers of the court over the subject matter 
of the bill or the cause of action.  It only extends its jurisdiction to parties not before falling 
within it.’") (citations omitted); see also Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447, 454 (1854) 
("[L]ooking to the act of congress applicable to this subject-matter, it appears that the rights 
claimed by this bill are expressly conferred by way of forfeiture."). 
 40. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) ("Prior 
to the Copyright Act of 1909 . . . there had been no statutory provision for the recovery of 
profits, but that recovery had been allowed in equity both in copyright and patent cases as 
appropriate equitable relief incident to a decree for an injunction.") (citations omitted); 
1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.7, at 87–88 (1978) ("Decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court in the 19th century established that in a suit in equity for 
infringement of patent or copyright, the patent or copyright holder was entitled to recover 
the profits made through the infringement.").  Palmer further stated, "Although the Court 
sometimes explained this as a method for measuring the plaintiff’s damages, it was clear that 
the relief was based on unjust enrichment, as the Court later recognized.  In the cases during 
this earlier period, recovery of profits could be obtained only in equity . . . ."  Id. 
 41. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) 
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976); 
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
 42. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964). 
 43. See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121–23 (1884) (affirming the lower court’s 
reward of nominal damages).  
 44. See Nike Inc. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(stating that Congress reported that "it now appears that the design patent laws provide no 
effectual money recovery for infringement"). 
 45. See Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 346 (1st Cir. 1942) 
("Accountability of an infringer for profits was enforced in equity, both in patent and 
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IV.  Semantics 
"The terminology of restitution is abstruse and confusing and is no matter 
for amateurs."46 
There is broad agreement among many of the leading authors of articles 
on restitution that this discipline is not understood well by practitioners or 
jurists, as the number of "professionals" is very limited.47  Professor Andrew 
Kull, the Reporter for the Third Restatement, suggests that part of the 
confusion may lie with some of the key terms.48  "Restitution" may have been 
a poor choice for the First Restatement as it is commonly associated with 
compensating damages.49  The authors of the First Restatement tried to 
introduce the term "restitution" with a revised meaning, but the term’s 
flexibility led to substantial confusion.50  By renaming the Third Restatement 
to include both restitution and unjust enrichment, the authors manifest their 
belief that the two terms are synonymous.  Now the authors of the Third 
Restatement offer another synonym—disgorgement.  It should be understood 
                                                                                                                 
copyright cases, on the same equitable principles, even before the patent and copyright laws 
specifically authorized this relief."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 (2011) (describing a restitution claim based on unauthorized 
interference with recognized forms of intellectual property). 
 46. 1 DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES § 4.1(2), at 556 
(2d ed. 1993). 
 47. See Colleen Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 
1577, 1581 (2002) ("The general law of restitution is for many an obscure subject, perhaps 
explaining why so much confusion exists as to when monetary remedies are properly 
characterized as restitutionary."); see also Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. 
L. REV. 1191, 1191–92 (1995) ("The linguistic confusion that bedevils the law of 
restitution—necessitating laborious definitions before anyone can understand what you are 
talking about—affords an early indication that the common name of this neglected body was 
significantly ill-chosen."); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 
TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1989) ("Despite its importance, restitution is a relatively neglected 
and underdeveloped part of the law."); Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the 
Mississippi Tobacco Settlement:  Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 892 
(1999) ("Restitution is becoming a lost art . . . ."). 
 48. See Kull, supra note 47, at 1195 (discussing the "persistent uncertainty" associated 
with the law of restitution). 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. e(2) 
(2011) ("It is a natural use of the language to speak of requiring a criminal to ‘make 
restitution’; the problem is that the liability imposed in such cases is not based primarily on 
unjust enrichment, but on compensation for harm."). 
 50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. c 
(2011) ("As posed today in American courts, the question whether restitution is legal or 
equitable is essentially artificial. . . .  The likely explanation lies first in the protean character 
of the word ‘restitution.’ . . .  Second is the attenuated association of ideas that runs from 
‘restitution’ through ‘unjust enrichment’ to ‘equity.’"). 
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that by equating disgorgement to an accounting in equity,51 the authors intend 
all three terms to be largely synonymous and measured as an accounting for 
defendants with wrongful intent.  At present, there is substantial confusion in 
federal agency case law between the three terms, as unjust enrichment and 
restitution are sometimes distinguished from disgorgement, which is held to 
preclude counter-restitution as a matter of law.52  For the purposes of this 
Article, the term "gross disgorgement" is intended to refer to the measure of 
unjust enrichment without offsets for counter-restitution as a matter of law.  
Similarly, the Article will refer to disgorgement by "default" to include cases 
in which the defendant is awarded no counter-restitution because she failed to 
establish sufficient evidence or the defendant’s unjust acts were held as 
contempt. 
A.  Profit vs. Advantage 
The distinction between the objectives of disgorging the defendant’s 
profit or the defendant’s advantage might seem slight but it has been 
magnified to justify two opposing views of measuring unjust enrichment or 
restitution.  Advocates of the full-absorption approach to measuring 
restitution—principally, the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits53—assert that 
because the goal is to measure the defendant’s profits, such a measure should 
deduct allocated overhead and other fixed costs from the defendant’s 
revenues to conform with the normal accounting definition of profit.  
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116 n.24 (2d Cir. 2006) 
("The history of the use of ‘disgorgement’ to mean the giving up of wrongly-gotten assets is 
uncertain.  Although the Oxford English Dictionary traces such use to 1837 . . . in 1974 it 
‘appeared to be a term of modern vintage’ in legal contexts to one federal court." (citations 
omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. a (2011) 
(stating that restitution measured by the defendant’s wrongful gain is frequently called 
"disgorgement," or an "accounting," or an "accounting for profits"). 
 52. See infra Section IX (discussing both Federal Trade Commission and Food and 
Drug Administration claims for gross disgorgement). 
 53. See Hamill Am., Inc. v. GFI, Inc., 193 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]e have 
assumed that general overhead expenses were deductible and reviewed only the sufficiency 
of the nexus between the expense and the infringing product and/or adequacy of the adduced 
formula for allocating overhead costs to the production of the infringing product."); Frank 
Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 515 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A portion 
of an infringer’s overhead properly may be deducted from gross revenues to arrive at profits, 
at least where the infringement was not willful, conscious, or deliberate."); Sammons v. 
Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 348 (1st Cir. 1942) ("[T]he cases seem to assume, 
without much discussion, that the infringer is entitled to a deduction of that portion of the 
overhead expense properly allocable to the particular job."). 
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Supporters of the incremental income approach—principally, the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits54—advocate excluding fixed costs in the 
measure of counter-restitution to ensure that the defendant is denied any 
incentive to pursue her unjust actions.55 
The 1872 Supreme Court opinion in Mowry v. Whitney56 focused less on 
the defendant’s literal profits and more broadly on the defendant’s fruits of 
the advantage gained: 
The question to be determined in this case is, what advantage did the 
defendant derive from using the complainant’s invention over what he had 
in using other processes then open to the public and adequate to enable 
him to obtain an equally beneficial result.  The fruits of that advantage are 
his profits. . . .  That advantage is the measure of profits.57 
This phrase has been widely repeated and cited.58  The Supreme Court 
highlighted the same concept in 1940.59  The focus on the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See Abbott Labs. v. Unlimited Beverages, Inc., 218 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 
2000) (stating that a court can award the defendant’s profits to the plaintiff under the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) 
("By preventing infringers from obtaining any net profit it makes any would-be infringer 
negotiate directly with the owner of a copyright that he wants to use, rather than bypass the 
market by stealing the copyright and forcing the owner to seek compensation from the courts 
for his loss."); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co. Inc., 613 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1980) 
("[W]e find the district court properly ordered [the defendant] to account the plaintiffs for 
the profits it earned from its willful infringement.  This accounting serves two purposes:  
[R]emedying unjust enrichment and deterring future infringement."). 
 55. Financial incentives are deemed significant if the defendant’s activities are 
allowed to absorb fixed costs.  For a detailed discussion of the case law that supports the full 
absorption or incremental cost approaches, see Roach, supra note 17. 
 56. See Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 620, 648–53 (1871) (holding that the charge of 
the infringement against the defendant is sustained, but the defendant is not liable to the 
plaintiff for interest on profits). 
 57. Id. at 651. 
 58. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940) 
("The profits, therefore, which [the defendant] must account for, are . . . the fruits of the 
advantage which he derived from the use of that invention . . . ."); Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 
565, 583 (1895); Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139, 147 (1894); Sessions v. 
Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 45 (1892); Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 197–
98 (1881); Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253, 255 (1881); Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. 205, 
228 (1874); Swan Carburetor Co. v. Nash Motors Co., 133 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1943); 
Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1938); Dunkley Co. v. 
Cent. Cal. Canneries, 7 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1925); Van Kannel Revolving Door Co. v. 
Uhrich, 297 F. 363, 368 (8th Cir. 1924); Phila. Rubber Works Co. v. U.S. Rubber 
Reclaiming Works, 277 F. 171, 176 (2d Cir. 1921); Cambria Iron Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 
224 F. 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1915); Wales v. Waterbury Mfg. Co., 101 F. 126, 129 (2d Cir. 
1900); Bus. Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1213, 1238 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 887 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1989); Van Brunt v. La 
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advantage, as distinguished from profit, evolved from two influences.  First, 
there exists case law for claims against a trustee that addressed enrichment 
as "the fruit of the advantage" before the Supreme Court used the phrase in 
1872.60  It seems unlikely that Justice Strong’s opinion in Mowry borrowed 
the term from a Delaware fraud case61 or a Mississippi fiduciary case;62 it 
seems more likely that the three cases borrowed the term from a common 
source presently unknown. 
The second influence is from claims for negative enrichment, 
recognized by American courts as distinguished from British courts, which 
do not recognize such claims even today.63  The Supreme Court faced a 
series of cases addressing liability for patent infringement against a 
defendant whose operations were unprofitable.  The Court held that the 
defendant is enriched if the plaintiff can show that the defendant’s losses 
would have been greater without the infringement, reflecting the "but-for" 
standard of causation and apportionment.  The fruit of the advantage was 
                                                                                                                 
Crosse Plow Co., 208 F. 281, 287 (W.D. Wis. 1913), aff’d, 220 F. 626 (7th Cir. 1915). 
 59. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940); see also 
Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383, 408 (D. Md. 1963) 
(discussing the comparison between "advantages" and "profits"); Gotham Silk Hosiery Co. 
v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 344, 345–46 (D. Del. 1940) ("In settling an 
accounting between a patentee and an infringer of the patent, the question is:  [N]ot what 
profits the latter has made in his business, or from his manner of conducting it, but what 
advantage has he derived from his use of the patented invention?" (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. 
v. Turrill (In re Cawood Patent), 94 U.S. 695, 696 (1877), aff’d, 110 U.S. 301 (1884))). 
 60. See Miller v. Baynard, 7 Del. 559, 567–68 (Del. Err. & App. 1863) ("[I]s it right to 
permit [the defendant], either at law or equity, to avail himself of the fruits of an advantage 
obtained by artifice or deception?"); Winn v. Dillon, 27 Miss. 494, 497 (Miss. Err. & App. 
1854) ("[T]he well-established principles of equity prevent a party from reaping the fruits of 
such an advantage, and declare that the property so acquired must be held in trust for the 
benefit of the party justly entitled to it.").  
 61. Miller, 7 Del. at 567–68.  
 62. Winn, 27 Miss. at 497. 
 63. The British definition of unjust enrichment has not included the notion of 
"negative unjust enrichment."  Consider the case of Celaneses Int’l Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 
[1999] RPC 203 (Ch. D. 1998), relating to the infringement of a patent on acetic acid.  Two 
operations of the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s patent. Id. at 203.  The judge held that 
unjust enrichment could only be awarded from the profitable operation despite the fact that 
both incurred savings as a result of the infringement.  Id. at 204; see also Attorney Gen. v. 
Blake, [2001] 1 AC (HL(E)) 284 (discussing whether an account for profits can be given as 
a remedy for breach of contract); JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED DAMAGES:  CONTRACT 
TORT, EQUITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 74–76 (2002) (discussing disgorgement 
damages when no profit is made, but expense is saved). 
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defined as an improvement in the defendant’s profits or savings, not the 
profits themselves.64 
Courts and legislators share the goal of denying any economic 
incentive to infringe.65  For example, Congress explicitly stated that the 
goal of the Lanham Act is to deny that incentive.66  Supporters of the 
incremental cost approach assert that targeting the disgorgement of 
advantage denies all incentives, including absorption of overhead.67  
Advocates of the full absorption approach focus instead on disgorging 
"profit," which they measure in a literal accounting sense.68  Their approach 
argues that fixed overhead must be deducted from operating income to 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Turrill (In re Cawood Patent), 94 U.S. 695, 710 (1877), 
aff’d, 110 U.S. 301 (1884) ("In settling an account between a patentee and an infringer of the 
patent, the question is, not what profits the latter has made in his business, or from his 
manner of conducting it, but what advantage has he derived from his use of the patented 
invention."); see also Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253, 255 (1882) ("The question to be 
determined . . . is, what advantage did the defendant derive from using the complainant’s 
invention over what he had in using other processes then open to the public, and adequate to 
enable him to obtain an equally beneficial result.  The fruits of the advantage are his 
profits."); DOBBS, supra note 46, § 4.5(2), at 632 n.6 ("If the defendant has realized savings 
or will more likely than not realize savings . . . those savings can form the basis for figuring 
restitution.  The savings measure is not a market measure.  To save an expense is to increase 
a profit or surplus. . . .  [T]his is a consequential restitution measure."). 
 65. See Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 804 (1870), superseded by 
statute, Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778, as recognized in Am. Med. 
Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The controlling consideration is 
that he shall not profit by his wrong. A more favorable rule would offer a premium to 
dishonesty and invite to aggression."); Dean v. Mason, 61 U.S. 198, 203 (1858) ("The rule in 
such a case is, the amount of profits received by the unlawful use of the machines, as this, in 
general, is the damage done to the owner of the patent."); Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann 
Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that a restrictive approach to 
accounting of profits does not meet the goals of the Lanham Act); Teaching Co. v. Unapix 
Entm’t, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 567, 589 (E.D. Va. 2000) (discussing whether accounting of the 
profits of a trademark infringer is proper); Dad’s Root Beer Co. v. Doc’s Beverages, Inc., 94 
F. Supp. 121, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff’d, 193 F. Supp. 77 (2d Cir. 1951) (applying New 
York law). 
 66. See Maier Brewing Co., 390 F.2d at 122 (stating that to accomplish the goals of 
the Lanham Act, courts must make "acts of trade-mark infringement, or at the very least acts 
of deliberate trade-mark piracy, unprofitable"). 
 67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. e 
(2011) ("The object of the disgorgement remedy—to eliminate the possibility of profit from 
conscious wrongdoing—is one of the cornerstones of the law of restitution and unjust 
enrichment."). 
 68. See id. § 42 cmt. i ("By contrast, the result of excluding a deduction that is relevant 
to the calculation of net profits—and for which the defendant will not otherwise be 
reimbursed—is that the accounting for profits is made to encompass a punitive element."). 
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conform to normal accounting practice.69  Critics of full absorption, 
including the author of this Article, respond that there is no basis for 
interjecting modern accounting practices into a traditional remedy.70  The 
term "profit" was in general use well before the development of generally 
accepted accounting principles.71  Second, measuring profit for 
disgorgement has always been distinct from normal management 
accounting, as it makes adjustments for the services of the defendant, 
infringing expenses, and public policy concerns.  Third, the term 
"advantage" implies the marginal benefit profit in excess of the defendant’s 
"but-for" position.72  
The Third Restatement fully reflects the split in federal circuits over 
the two approaches:  The full absorption approach is supported in Section 
42 and the incremental cost approach in Section 51.73  The rationale of 
Section 51 focuses on denying the incentive to infringe:  
By contrast, the defendant will not be allowed to deduct expenses (such 
as ordinary overhead) that would have been incurred in any event, if the 
result would be that defendant’s wrongful activities—by defraying a 
portion of overall expenses—yield an increased profit from defendant’s 
operations as a whole.74 
Section 42 concludes that the disgorgement of the defendant’s income 
without a credit for allocated overhead would be punitive and must be 
avoided.75  To an outsider of the Third Restatement, the contradiction in 
principles may be further confused by the range of terms used to describe 
the object of the measurement process.  The Third Restatement speaks of 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See id. § 51 cmt. e (providing how profits are accounted and discussing the 
question of attribution). 
 70. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 17, at 587, 590 (criticizing the full-absorption 
approach and supporting the incremental cost approach, and stating that the full-absorption 
approach appears inconsistent with the primary purpose of the Third Restatement). 
 71. See, e.g., Mark 8:36 (King James) ("For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain 
the whole world, and lose his own soul?"); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE 
SHREW, act 1, sc. 1 ("No profit grows where is no pleasure ta’en:  In brief, sir, study what 
you most affect."). 
 72. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (discussing the "but-for" doctrine). 
 73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. d 
(2011) (discussing damages and profits); id. § 51 cmt. e (citing uses of the "incremental 
change method"). 
 74. Id. § 51 cmt. h. 
 75. Compare id. § 51 cmt. e (providing a good example of the incremental approach), 
with id. § 42 (providing a good example of the full absorption approach). 
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disgorging profit, net profit, gain, net gain, benefit, etc.76  In Section IX, the 
Article will show that federal agencies tend to exploit the ongoing 
confusion over the distinctions between restitution, unjust enrichment, 
disgorgement and terms that vary in meaning by claiming legal remedies as 
remedies in equity. 
V.  Quasi-Trustee 
Understanding the contributions of trust law to measuring unjust 
enrichment in equity is important not only to provide a grounding in the 
foundations of the remedy but also to appreciate the boundaries to the 
measure.  In a 1924 opinion on patent remedies, Judge Geiger, a federal 
district judge in Wisconsin, suggested that the standard for awarding 
indemnity to a trustee in default should be the minimum standard for 
measuring counter-restitution for willful defendants’ unjust enrichment.77  
Assuming that a patent infringer’s liability is analogous to that of a trustee 
in default, he concluded that such a defendant should be treated no worse.78 
The Third Restatement acknowledges a connection between the law of 
trusts and the law of restitution and unjust enrichment.79  In particular, the 
Third Restatement affirms Judge Geiger’s assumption that measuring unjust 
enrichment for the misappropriation of intellectual property should be 
measured no more severely than for a trustee in default: "Thus in the 
context of intellectual property, the notion of treating the infringer as a 
trustee under a duty to account has been codified in the remedial provisions 
of the Copyright Act . . . ."80 
The Supreme Court has held that while a defendant to a claim ancillary 
to injunctive relief is not, in fact, a trustee to the plaintiff, the measure of 
the defendant’s unjust enrichment greatly resembles that for a trustee in 
default.81  The Court analyzed this similarity as it related to the issue of 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See, e.g., id. § 42 (addressing how to account for profits, gains, and benefits); id. 
§ 51 (instructing how to determine net profit). 
 77. See Christensen v. Nat’l Brake & Elec. Co., 10 F.2d 856, 861–62 (E.D. Wis. 1924) 
(discussing the characterization of an infringer as a trustee ex maleficio). 
 78. See id. at 862 ("[I]t would be anomalous to withhold from an infringer, merely 
because his liability is said to be analogous to that of a trustee ex maleficio, credits for 
disbursements which . . . would have been unhesitatingly given him because the law 
demands that he incur them as a matter of duty."). 
 79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).  
 80. Id. § 51 cmt. i. 
 81. See Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 214 (1881). 
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jurisdiction for a patent claim.82  The specific issue concerned whether a 
patent owner could seek monetary relief in equity after the patent expired.83  
The Court held that while the defendant’s position was similar to that of a 
defendant trustee, there was no fiduciary relationship.84  In the absence of a 
legitimate claim for injunctive relief, the owner of an expired patent had no 
jurisdiction in equity.  However, the Court held in a different case that the 
plaintiff’s remedy should be measured as if the defendant were a self-
dealing trustee.85  This principle has been frequently repeated by key 
opinions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including Sheldon.86 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See id. ("The patentee, succeeding in establishing his right, is entitled to an 
account of the profits realized by the infringer, and that the rule for ascertaining the amount 
of such profits is that of treating the infringer as though he were a trustee for the patentee, in 
respect to profits."). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. ("[I]t is nowhere said that the patentee’s right to an account is based upon 
the idea that there is a fiduciary relation created between him and the wrong-doer by the fact 
of infringement.").  
 85. See id.; see also Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 148 (1888), superseded by 
statute, Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79587, 60 Stat. 778, as recognized in Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983) (stating that courts should award relief as 
"measured by the same rule that courts of equity apply to the case of a trustee who has 
wrongfully used the trust property for his own advantage"). 
 86. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) (stating 
that prior to a statutory provision, recovering profits had been allowed in equity as 
appropriate relief "incident to a decree for an injunction"); L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wm. 
Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 100 (1928) (stating that the defendant does not have to 
account for materials and labor, but "it does not follow that [the defendant] should be 
allowed what he paid for the chance to what he knew that he had no right to do"); Hamilton-
Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916) (requiring, through equity, 
that a trademark infringer account for and yield gains to the true owner by analogy to a 
trustee’s liability for profits acquired by wrongful use of trust property); Packet Co. v. 
Sickles, 86 U.S. 611, 617–18 (1873) ("It is that of converting the infringer into a trustee for 
the patentee as regards the profits thus made, and the adjustment of these profits is subject to 
all the equitable considerations which are necessary to do complete justice between the 
parties . . . ."); Georgia Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 517 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("[A] compensation computed and measured by the same rule that courts of 
equity apply to the case of a trustee who has wrongfully used the trust property for his own 
advantage."); Dad’s Root Beer Co. v. Doc’s Beverages, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 121, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 
1950), aff’d, 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951) (stating the rule governing federal trademark 
infringement law); Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 38 F. Supp. 639, 
642 (D. Del. 1941) ("The patent infringer is not a trustee and the trust analogy is merely used 
as a measure of compensation."); see also Joel Eichengrun, Remedying the Remedy of 
Accounting, 60 IND. L.J. 463, 484 (1985) ("[T]he reference to constructive trust may be read 
as suggesting an analogy; just as the court will declare a wrongdoer to be a fictitious, 
‘constructive’ trustee so, too, the court will impose the obligation to account on a wrongdoer 
when it is appropriate . . . ."). 
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While the claim of a trustee in default for compensation for services is 
problematic, the claim for indemnity for reasonable expenses by that same 
trustee is more assured.  Section 244 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
provides that the trustee’s indemnity survives a breach of trust,87 even if the 
expense was not properly incurred,88 if those expenses benefit the trust. 
Otherwise the estate would be unjustly enriched.  Similarly, Section 177 of 
the First Restatement makes it clear that counter-restitution is required 
regardless of whether the defendant committed fraud or the plaintiff made a 
mistake.89 
Professor Rounds explains the trustee’s right to indemnity even when 
the trustee is in default: 
It is black letter law that if a trustee incurs an expense incident to an 
unauthorized self dealing transaction, and in so doing confers upon the 
trust estate a benefit, the trustee is ordinarily entitled to indemnity to the 
extent of the benefit of the value conferred.  He who seeks equity must 
do equity.  The Restatement (Third) of Trusts is generally in accord.  
Under the Uniform Trust Code, a trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out 
of the trust property, with interest as appropriate, expenses that were not 
properly incurred in the administration of the trust to the extent 
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust.90 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS:  INDEMNITY OF TRUSTEE FOR EXPENSES 
§ 244 cmt. e (1959) ("If the trustee has properly incurred an expense for which he would be 
entitled to indemnity but has also incurred a liability for a breach of trust . . . the amount of 
his liability can be set off against the amount to which he would otherwise be entitled as 
indemnity . . . ."); id. § 244 cmt. c ("To the extent to which the trustee is entitled to 
indemnity, he has a security interest in the trust property.  He will not be compelled to 
transfer the trust property to the beneficiary . . . until he is paid or secured for the amount of 
expenses properly incurred . . . ."). 
 88. See id. § 245(2) ("Although an expense is not properly incurred in the 
administration of the trust, the trustee is entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate for such 
expense to the extent that he has thereby conferred a benefit upon the trust estate, unless 
under the circumstances it is inequitable . . . ."). 
 89. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION:  CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND 
ANALOGOUS EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 177 cmt. c (1937) ("The rule stated in this Section is 
applicable where the owner of property transfers it to another, being induced by fraud, 
duress, undue influence or mistake, and the transferee discharges a mortgage upon the 
property, or pays taxes thereon (see § 158, Comment b).").  
 90. Rounds, supra note 36, at 348–49 (2010) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 245 cmts. c–d (1959)); see also 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND 
ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 18.1.2.6, at 1294–95 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing when a trustee 
improperly incurs an expense on behalf of the trust); id. § 22.2.1, at 1634–35 (discussing 
when a trustee is entitled to indemnity for expenses improperly incurred); JOHN MOWBRAY 
ET AL., LEWIN ON TRUSTS ¶ 21-25, at 539–40 (17th ed. 2000) (discussing "indemnity in 
respect of unauthorized transactions"). 
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Rounds cautions, however, that under the Uniform Trust Code,91 the denial 
or delay of a trustee’s indemnity can be justified by a court after balancing 
five equitable factors, including the benefit to the plaintiff.92 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency93 takes a mixed view.  Comment 
c of Section 403 provides that a disloyal agent who profits improperly may 
not deduct the amount of any expenses incurred in acquiring the profit.94 
The case opinions that have addressed this obscure provision are divided.  
Cases that cited the provision favorably denied some, but not all of the 
disloyal agent’s expenses.95  A subsequent case that rejected the provision, 
however, supported its opposition by citing a U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia opinion.96  Neither the D.C. Circuit opinion nor a 
separate opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
specifically addresses the Restatement provision, but both cases affirm 
counter-restitution for a disloyal agent.97  The D.C. Circuit opinion related 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 709 (2006) (providing the five appropriate grounds 
for delay or denial of reimbursement for expenses which benefited the trust). 
 92. See Rounds, supra note 36, at 349 n.246 (discussing the Uniform Trust Code).  
Section 709 of the Uniform Trust Code provides: 
Appropriate grounds . . . [for delay or even denying reimbursement for expenses 
which benefited the trust] . . . include:  (1) [W]hether the trustee acted in bad 
faith in incurring the expense; (2) whether the trustee knew that the expense was 
inappropriate; (3) whether the trustee reasonably believed the expense was 
necessary for the preservation of the trust estate; (4) whether the expense has 
resulted in a benefit; and (5) whether indemnity can be allowed without 
defeating or impairing the purposes of the trust. 
Uniform Trust Code § 709 (2006). 
 93. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958). 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY:  LIABILITIES § 403 cmt. c (1958) ("An 
agent who receives a bribe or otherwise profits improperly cannot, in an action by the 
principal to recover it or its value, deduct the amount of expenses to which he has been put 
in acquiring it."). 
 95. See Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Surety Co., 290 N.W. 231, 235 (Minn. 
1940) (agreeing with Restatement of Agency in disallowing truck operating costs but 
allowing the cost of grain in grain sale revenue). 
 96. See Burg v. Miniature Precision Components, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 192, 199 (Wis. 
1983) ("The court of appeals thoroughly analyzed this issue and in a well-reasoned opinion 
concluded that . . . it would be unfair to the agent and provide a windfall to the principal to 
deprive the agent of his or her gross receipts without permitting a deduction for legitimate 
business expenses."). 
 97. See Jay v. Gen. Realties Co., 49 A.2d 752, 755 (D.C. 1946) ("But we think that 
save in exceptional cases such a rule is too harsh . . . .  This is the reasoning of a number of 
cases which declare that the net rather than the gross profit realized by an agent should be 
the measure of recovery." (citing Anderson Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg. Co., 20 S.E.2d 818 
(N.C. 1942))); see also Willis v. Van Woy, 20 So. 2d 690, 692 (Fla. 1945) (stating that the 
value of services should be ascertained and that amount credited against the agent’s secret 
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to the secret profit of a real estate agent and the Fourth Circuit opinion to a 
federal government employee who made a profit smuggling goods into 
India under cover of his position at Association for Indians Development 
(AID).98 
Inexplicably, Section 403 of the Restatement of Agency was recently 
cited by the Third Restatement without mention of Section 439, which 
contradicts Section 403:99 
Indemnity is allowed, even though in the transaction the agent 
committed a breach of trust.  Thus where an agent, who is authorized to 
buy property, makes a secret profit, the principal must indemnify the 
agent for his proper expenditures, although entitled to any improper 
profit made by the agent.100 
Using the analogy of quasi-trustee inevitably leads to the conclusion that 
the defendant in an unjust enrichment case has a right to prove counter-
restitution just as much as the defaulting trustee is entitled to indemnity.  
Furthermore, the standard for trustee indemnity, examining the benefit to 
the plaintiff, can provide a broader foundation for reviewing proposed 
counter-restitution.  Professor Charles Rounds agrees: 
                                                                                                                 
profit which has been awarded as damages to the plaintiff); Schwarting v. Artel, 40 Cal. 
App. 2d 433, 441 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940) ("[W]here an agent has secretly profited . . . to 
the end that equity be done to all parties, he is entitled to be reimbursed for any portion of 
the purchase money advanced by him and for all expense necessarily incurred by him in 
protecting and conserving the property of his principal."); Sawyer v. Issenhuth, 141 N.W. 
378, 380 (S.D. 1913) ("Defendant and his wife . . . held the legal title to said real estate in 
trust for plaintiff, and when defendant later sold the same plaintiff was entitled to the net 
proceeds or profits of such sale over and above what she had already received from 
defendant."); Judevine v. Hardwick, 49 Vt. 180, 182 (Vt. 1876) (stating that an agent must 
account to his principal for whatever profits he makes); Dutton v. Willner, 52 N.Y. 312, 319 
(N.Y. 1873) (ordering the arrant agent to pay the proceeds of the life insurance policy to the 
principal’s estate but the agent was credited for premium payments). 
 98. See United States v. Wight, 839 F.2d 193, 197 (4th Cir. 1987) ("In determining the 
amount of wrongful profits that a principal may recover from an agent, the trial court must 
deduct the agent’s expenses." (citing Jay v. Gen. Realties Co., 49 A.2d 752, 755 (D.C. 
1946))). 
 99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (2011) 
(stating that Illustration 21 is based on Section 403, cmt. c). 
 100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY:  CONTRACTUAL AND RESTITUTIONAL DUTIES 
AND LIABILITIES § 439 cmt. a (citing Schwarting v. Artel, 105 P.2d 380 (1940)); see also 
SCOTT, supra note 37, § 243 ("Although the trustee is denied compensation because of 
breaches of trust committed by him, he is not denied indemnity for expenses properly 
incurred by him; but his liability for loss resulting from a breach of trust may be set off 
against him claim to indemnity."). 
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Whether it is the case of the trustee of an express trust who has engaged 
in unauthorized self-dealing or the proprietary remedial constructive 
trustee of someone else’s IP rights, this equitable right of indemnity is 
grounded in Equity’s contribution to the law of unjust enrichment, 
specifically the equitable right of counter-restitution. The court in equity 
is loath to fashion a remedy that leaves either party unjustly enriched.101 
VI.  Counter-Restitution 
"‘If you are fraudulently induced to buy a cake you may return it and get 
back your price; but you cannot both eat your cake and return your 
cake.’"102 
This Article advocates recognition of a rule of counter-restitution that 
requires the court to provide a defendant the opportunity to prove that the 
amount of unjust enrichment initially established by the plaintiff should be 
reduced or "set-off" on account of apportionment or reasonable expenses 
necessary to maintain the plaintiff’s asset or generate the revenues that 
benefitted the plaintiff. 
Few observers would deny the importance of counter-restitution, 
because it manifests the court in equity’s commitment to fairness and 
justice for both parties.  When a court in equity weighs a remedy, it strives 
to leave neither party unjustly enriched.  George Palmer explains this key 
feature in relation to rescission claims: 
The requirement that a party who obtains restitution must return or 
otherwise account for benefits received in an exchange transaction does 
not rest on a principle of mechanics: that since the transaction is being 
rescinded it necessarily follows that there must be a reexchange of 
benefits transferred on each side.  Instead, the true basis of the 
requirement is to prevent the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff, who is 
himself seeking restitution based on the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment.103 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Rounds, supra note 36, at 349. 
 102. CHARLES MITCHELL & PAUL MITCHELL, LANDMARK CASES IN THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION 143 (2006) (quoting Clarke v. Dickson (1858) EB & E 148, 152–54; 120 ER 
463, 465–66). 
 103. See PALMER, supra note 40, § 3.12, at 303; see also Packet Co. v. Sickles, 86 U.S. 
611, 617–18 (1873) ("It is that of converting the infringer into a trustee for the patentee as 
regards the profits thus made; and the adjustment of these profits is subject to all the 
equitable considerations which are necessary to do complete justice between the 
parties . . . ."). 
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At times the principle of "total equity" is also supported by (1) the maxim 
that to get equity you must do equity;104 (2) the belief that to deny counter-
restitution can result in the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff;105 and (3) the 
belief that to deny counter-restitution would punish the defendant, a result 
repugnant to courts in equity.106 
The key issues, exacerbated by the surge in litigation by federal 
agencies, are whether all defendants are entitled to the opportunity to prove 
appropriate counter-restitution, and whether this opportunity is regularly 
withheld, as a matter of law, from predefined subgroups or a certain type of 
individual defendant because of the nature of their unjust acts. 
The process of measuring unjust enrichment is often described as a 
two-step process107:  (1) for the plaintiff to shift the burden of proof by 
identifying the relevant assets or revenues in defendant’s possession that 
relate to the unjust act; and (2) for the defendant to prove adjustments for 
counter-restitution.108  "Just as the trustee must substantiate any claims for 
indemnity, the defendant in a claim for unjust enrichment in equity has the 
burden of proving all offsets for counter-restitution."109  In practice, the 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See Stanley v. Gadsby, 35 U.S. 521, 522 (1836) (holding that to be entitled to 
injunctive relief against a usurious creditor, the debtor must offer to pay interest and 
principal); Cardiac Thoracic v. Bond, 840 S.W.2d 188, 193 (Ark. 1992) ("The equitable 
objective of a return to the status quo as the result of a rescission is consistent with the 
equitable maxim ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’"). 
 105. See DAN DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3, at 254–55 (1973) 
(stating that rescission is normally accompanied by restitution on both sides, which "restores 
the pre-existing state of affairs"). The Restatement of Restitution is in full accord:  "Where 
the right to restitution is dependent upon restoration by the person seeking restitution, he 
cannot enforce a constructive trust without making restoration."  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
RESTITUTION:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 177 (1937). 
 106. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 145 (1888) superseded by statute, Act of 
Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79587, 60 Stat. 778, as recognized in Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex 
Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983) ("[I]t is inconsistent with the ordinary principles and practice of 
courts of chancery . . . to permit the wrongdoer . . . to undertake to punish him by obliging 
him to pay more than a fair compensation to the person wronged."); see also Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940) (stating that the infringer must 
only account for the "fruits of the advantage" which he derived from the infringement); 
Christensen v. National Brake & Electric Co, 10 F.2d 856, 862 (E.D. Wis. 1926) (noting that 
equity is loath to fashion a remedy that is "punitive"). 
 107. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 69 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172 cmt. b (1959) (stating the trustee’s 
duty to render accounts); id. at § 179 (discussing the duty to keep trust property separate 
from the trustee’s own property); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. 
Co., 225 U.S. 604, 619 (1912) (stating that the plaintiff was entitled only "to recover such 
part of the commingled profits as was attributable to the use of [the plaintiff’s] invention"). 
 109. Roach, supra note 17, at 516–17; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 (2011) ("This means that the defendant bears the burden of 
COUNTER-RESTITUTION 1293 
court has awarded the defendant’s revenues in only about 60% of the cases 
in which the defendant defaulted on this burden.110  Alternatively, the court 
may estimate those expenses.  The Federal and Second Circuits have held 
that the court has an obligation to estimate those expenses when the 
defendant has not introduced adequate evidence.111 
Of course, if the defendant fails her burden of proof and the court 
awards the defendant’s revenues, then the revenues are awarded by default 
and not as a matter of law.112  It is unfortunate that in this area of the law, 
some opinions, in citing precedents that supposedly support gross 
disgorgement at law, fail to distinguish opinions that hold for gross 
disgorgement at law from disgorgement by default.  Thus some holdings for 
disgorgement at law are supported by opinions that only awarded gross 
disgorgement as a result of the defendant’s failure to evidence any non-
infringing expenses or a finding of contempt.113 
                                                                                                                 
establishing appropriate deductions from gross revenues to calculate net profits, and the 
parallel burden of establishing the portion of such profits that is derived from elements other 
than the defendant’s wrongdoing."). 
 110. See George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence:  Implied Jurisdiction and 
Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 61 
(2007) ("Out of approximately 116 opinions, the court held the defendant in default and 
ordered her to disgorge her revenues in seventy-three opinions.  In the remaining forty-three 
opinions, the court acknowledged the default rule but approved an alternative estimate or 
rule of thumb to establish the defendant’s benefit . . . .").  See, e.g., Stenograph L.L.C. v. 
Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (choosing to not disturb the 
judgment that reflects revenues in part); Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Two Wheel Corp., 918 
F.2d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that awarding of gross revenues is "clearly 
excessive"); Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(concluding that the plaintiff carried its burden in establishing revenues earned by the 
defendant for the infringement, and that the defendant failed to establish expenses). 
 111. See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 
1989) ("Even if Zarcone does not offer evidence of his costs (as he has not heretofore), the 
court should estimate them based on the evidence before it."); see also Dayva Int’l v. Award 
Prods. Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4386, at *10–11 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Thus, a trial court 
only has an independent duty to apportion profits, even where the defendant fails to present 
evidence, if it is clear from the record that not all the profits claimed are attributable to the 
infringement."); H-D Mich. Inc. v. Bikers Dream, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17259, at *22 
(C.D. Cal. 1998) ("South County argues that, in the absence of evidence proving its costs, 
the trier of fact has a duty to estimate expenses. . . .  [T]he Court may estimate costs when 
the Defendant has provided some basis on which costs may be determined."). 
 112. See Roach, supra note 110, at 61 (discussing what occurs when the defendant fails 
to satisfy its burden of proof). 
 113. Compare Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384 
(D. Conn. 2009) (providing a formula for calculating redress for consumer injury (citing 
F.T.C. v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 767 (10th Cir. 2004)), with Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 766 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Accordingly, when the FTC has proven a 
pattern or practice of contemptuous conduct at the liability stage by clear and convincing 
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For example, consider the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Securities & 
Exchange Commission v. JT Wallenbrock & Associates.114 That opinion 
justified the exclusion of any credit for expenses with a quote from 
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Blavin.115 Yet the Michigan district 
court and the Sixth Circuit in Blavin did not consider the issue of any 
offsetting expenses.116 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit erroneously justifies 
gross disgorgement by citing a case awarding disgorgement by default. 
The position of the Third Restatement on the right to prove counter-
restitution is both mixed and unclear.  A brief summary of the dispersed 
discussion of counter-restitution would show the following:  counter-
restitution is required in most cases and is required as to specific expenses 
in selected groups of cases;117 denying counter-restitution is punitive;118 and 
certain groups of cases do not warrant counter-restitution, including but not 
limited to intentional fraud,119 conversion of personal property, and trespass 
to minerals.120  Even as explained in the various sections and in the context 
of existing case law, these principles conflict.  If a fraud-feasor is denied 
counter-restitution as a matter of law, that defendant is being assessed a 
                                                                                                                 
evidence, a presumption arises that allows the district court to use all revenue attributable to 
the contemptuous conduct . . . as a baseline for assessing sanctions."). 
 114. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1117 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court did not err in assessing the entire $253.2 
million of disgorgement against the defendants or in imposing joint and several liability). 
 115. See id. at 1115; see also Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 714 (6th 
Cir. 1985) (holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment, its 
disgorgement order, and its disgorgement distribution plan). 
 116. See generally Blavin, 760 F.2d 706; Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blavin, 557 F. 
Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mich. 1983); see also Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes Equities Co., 
775 F. Supp. 211, 214 n.20 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ("Blavin does not explicitly hold that no 
deductions may be taken for expenses; the issue of expenses is never directly addressed."). 
 117. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 158 cmt. b (1937) ("[I]n the absence 
of extraordinary circumstances requiring the imposition of a penalty, if a person by fraud 
obtains title to land subject to a mortgage and pays the mortgage, he is entitled to 
compensation for such payment upon being required to surrender the land."); see also id. 
§ 177 cmt. c (stating that the defendant need not surrender property to the plaintiff without 
reimbursement for the payment of liens and taxes). 
 118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. h 
(2011) ("Denial of an otherwise appropriate deduction, by making the defendant liable in 
excess of net gains, results in a punitive sanction that the law of restitution normally attempts 
to avoid."). 
 119. See id. § 13 cmt. c (stating that this Restatement does not describe the substantive 
law of misrepresentation and therefore does not govern matters such as fraud). 
 120. See infra Part VIII (providing an analysis of gross disgorgement awarded for 
conversion of personal property, trespass to minerals and intentional fraud, which should be 
considered exceptions to the first three principles). 
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punitive remedy.  Comment e(3) of Section 51 notwithstanding,121 punitive 
remedies in equity are not just "to be avoided" but are outside of the 
jurisdiction of a court in equity.122  Section 177, Comment c of the First 
Restatement also contradicts Sections 13 and 54 of the Third Restatement, 
as the fraud-feasor does not have to make specific restitution of real 
property unless the plaintiff provides counter-restitution for taxes, mortgage 
payments, and other expenses.123 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (stating that restitution attempts to avoid 
any punitive remedies). 
 122. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 270 (1993) ("As this Court has long 
recognized, courts of equity would not . . . enforce penalties or award punitive damages. . . .  
[T]his limitation on equitable relief applied in the trust context as well, where plaintiffs 
could recover compensatory monetary relief for a breach of trust, but not punitive or 
exemplary damages."); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) ("A civil penalty was 
a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.  Remedies 
intended to punish culpable individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract 
compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not . . . equity." (citing 
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 536 (1970))); 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 405 (1940) ("[W]e perceive no 
ground for saying that in awarding profits to the copyright proprietor as a means of 
compensation, the court may make an award of profits which have been shown not to be due 
to the infringement."); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116 n.25 (2d Cir. 
2006) ("Because the remedy is remedial rather than punitive, the court may not order 
disgorgement above this amount." (citing Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 
446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971))); In re Estate of Corriea, 719 A.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. 
1998) (stating that disgorgement is meant to provide just compensation and not impose a 
penalty, much like a constructive trust); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. 
Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 77 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) (distinguishing "profits" from 
"proceeds"); id. at 78 ("The hardship of investor losses should not, however, be used as an 
excuse to impose a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of relief falls outside 
that remedy’s recognized parameters."); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. First City Fin. Corp., 
Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Disgorgement is an equitable remedy designed 
to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment and to deter others from violating securities 
laws."); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 782 F.2d 1249, 1253 
(5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the penalty imposed is not authorized by law because it 
constitutes a "penalty"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. i (2011) ("There are instances of wrongdoing in which the law of 
restitution imposes [a punitive element of damages]."). 
 123. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 177 (1937); 
("The owner cannot compel the transferee to surrender the property to him without 
reimbursing him for such expenditures."); see also Sanguinetti v. Strecker, 577 P.2d 404, 
410 (Nev. 1978) ("[E]ven a fraudulent grantee is entitled to reimbursement of ‘necessary 
expenditures in preserving the property.’" (quoting Morris v. Hanssen, 78 S.W.2d 87, 95 
(Mo. 1934))); Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 206 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that 
the plaintiff’s claim for fraud was entitled to rescission subject to reimbursing the defendant 
for taxes and repairs). 
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Applying trust law’s benefit standard for trustee indemnity would offer 
a useful default rule for scrutinizing proposed counter-restitution.  The 
combination of the benefit standard, public policy issues, and the exclusion 
of infringing expenses probably accounts for the majority of scrutiny of 
counter-restitution for IP claims.  In Comment e of Section 51, the Third 
Restatement advocates three justifications:  (1) the benefit standard; (2) the 
priority to avoid an unfair or punitive remedy; and (3) the doctrine of the 
officious claimant.124  The last standard is asserted as a baseline standard 
for all counter-restitution for willful defendants subjected to a claim for 
unjust enrichment, perhaps echoing doctrine expressed in Section 3 of the 
Third Restatement.125 
As an explanation for rejecting liability in some cases or for the 
rationale underlying the benefit standard, the officious claimant doctrine 
provides a rationale for the defendant to bear the burden of proof to show 
that her expenses or expenditures actually benefitted the plaintiff.  
However, the language in Sections 3 and 51 of the Third Restatement may 
be interpreted to say that counter-restitution should only be awarded as a 
matter of equitable discretion.  As such, it would contradict the existing 
practice of IP claims and trust law for indemnity and others. 
For example, a paradox continues in the Second Circuit between the 
Emergency Assistance Standard (EAS) and most IP claims.  Under the 
EAS, the plaintiff who provides emergency assistance which proves of 
benefit to the defendant is only entitled to reimbursement for proven 
marginal operating costs.126  Alternatively, in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn 
Pictures Corp.,127 it was established that Metro-Goldwyn Pictures (MGM) 
bargained with the plaintiff owner of a copyright in bad faith to license the 
script, and when negotiations broke down, MGM arranged to license 
another cheap script to cover up its misappropriation of the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (2011) 
(discussing what questions must be asked and what factors must be considered to determine 
what profits of the defendant are attributable to the underlying wrong). 
 125. See id. § 3 (2011) (describing how a claimant can recover more than a provable 
loss so that the defendant may be stripped of a wrongful gain). 
 126. See United States v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 580 F.2d 1122, 1127 (2d Cir. 
1978); Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 
830, 835 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 127. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1939), 
aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (holding that the borrowing was a deliberate plagiarism, 
defendants cannot be credited for any costs but what they paid for and the defendant’s share 
of net profits is limited to one-fifth). 
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script.128  Judge Hand, in an opinion that is cited frequently and approvingly 
in the Restatements, held that counter-restitution for MGM must include 
lavish salaries and bonuses for MGM’s key executives as well as generous 
credit for overhead and other fixed expenses that are normally associated 
with the movie-making process but not specifically with the movie in 
question.129  To reconcile these doctrines for measuring counter-restitution, 
one would be compelled to conclude that the Second Circuit endorsed the 
notion that it is better for the defendant to take than to give. 
The rule proposed herein would envision gross disgorgement only for 
conversion of personal property and trespass to minerals.  The next two 
sections will examine disgorgement by default to develop various 
conditions to the defendant’s right to counter-restitution, and analyze 
existing cases for gross disgorgement to determine if there are additional 
types of defendants which deserve no opportunity to prove counter-
restitution because of the unjust nature of their acts. 
VII.  Disgorgement by Default 
Counter-restitution and indemnity are conditioned on the defendant 
supporting his claim for offsets in such a way that any expenses or 
expenditures claimed must not be "infringing expenses" or otherwise 
violate the Court’s interpretation of public policy limits.130  Thus, the 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s proposed counter-restitution in 
Callaghan v. Myers131 because the defendant was seeking credit for the 
labor expense of copying the plaintiff’s protected material.132  Infringing 
expenses are frequently, but not necessarily, the services of the 
defendant.133  The Supreme Court also rejected counter-restitution for the 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See id. at 49 (providing background facts of the case). 
 129. See id. at 51–53 (addressing the defendant’s objections). 
 130. See Roach, supra note 110, at 67–73 (2007) (providing a survey of rulings on 
infringing expenses in IP cases). 
 131. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 667 (1888) (holding that the lower court 
decision was correct except with respect to the damages owed for one of the book volumes 
at issue). 
 132. See id. at 664 (1888) (rejecting counter-restitution for the salaries of the two 
owners as infringing expenses). 
 133. See City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 139 (1877) 
("[T]he defendant will not be allowed to diminish the show of profits by putting in 
unconscionable claims for personal services or other inequitable deductions.") (citations 
omitted). 
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costs of rendering standing timber into lumber in E.E. Wooden-Ware Co. v. 
United States,134 holding that it would be against public policy to otherwise 
encourage willful trespass on federal lands to gain timber for lumber.135  
Given the breadth of public policy issues, especially in a court of equity, the 
criterion cannot be fully defined and probably "swallows" the issue of 
infringing expenses. 
Traditional case law has typically rejected the services of the 
defendant or her immediate associates as infringing, especially if those 
services have a causal connection to the underlying unjust acts.136  The 
modern trend appears to be less focused on automatic rejection than 
reviewing the details to determine whether the defendant’s services 
benefited the plaintiff and should therefore be considered for partial or even 
full credit.  The trend is found in both IP cases137 and fiduciary cases.138  It 
is significant that the modern standard is frequently applied to the issuing of 
fees, if any, to lawyers that have committed disloyal acts.  Counter-
restitution for such a critical fiduciary agent should be the most difficult 
standard for compensation for the services of a willful defendant.  The 
Texas Supreme Court favorably cited the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers to justify a flexible approach: 
A lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may 
be required to forfeit some or all of the lawyer’s compensation for the 
matter.  In determining whether and to what extent forfeiture is 
appropriate, relevant considerations include the gravity and timing of the 
violation, its willfulness, its effect on the value of the lawyer’s work for 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See E.E. Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 437 (1882) (holding 
that the lower court’s valuation of damages was proper). 
 135. See id. at 434 (citing Livingstone v. Raywards Coal Co., 5 App. Cas. 25 (1880)). 
 136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. g (1995) ("The 
value of defendant’s own labor . . . and salaries and wages paid to persons responsible for 
the tortious conduct, are not ordinarily deductible.  Distributions of profits to partners or 
stockholders are also not ordinarily deductible."). 
 137. See, e.g., Int’l Consulting Servs. v. Cheap Tickets, Inc., No. 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 71689, at *17–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (determining that crediting the defendant for 
employee salaries was appropriate); see also Hair Assocs., Inc. v. Nat’l Hair Replacement 
Servs., 987 F. Supp. 569, 595 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (determining what calculation of revenues 
and expenses is appropriate). 
 138. See, e.g., City of Fort Worth v. Pippen, 439 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex. 1969) (stating 
that fiduciaries in breach could present evidence of counter-restitution based on the benefit 
to the plaintiff city); see also Boston Children’s Heart Found., Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d 
429, 435 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that a court can require a fiduciary to forfeit the right to 
retain or receive compensation for conduct in violation of his or her fiduciary duty, even 
absent a showing of actual injury to the principal). 
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the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the client, and the 
adequacy of other remedies.139 
That opinion cites cases relating to the law of eighteen other states that 
support the policy against automatic forfeiture of all of the fees in 
question.140 
There are also two overlapping groups of cases that hold that the 
willfulness of the defendant justifies the denial of allocated overhead as an 
offset to the defendant’s disgorgement, although neither group would 
dispute the defendant’s right to prove counter-restitution.  First, there is the 
Sheldon–Hamill line of cases.141  The Second Circuit was recently faced 
with a dilemma in Hamill America, Inc. v. G.F.I.,142 an appeal of a district 
court’s opinion that overhead should be denied in the measure of the 
monetary remedy in equity, an opinion that challenged the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in Sheldon.  As I explained in a prior article,143 Judge Martin made 
a strong argument, compatible with the rationale of the Third Restatement’s 
position in Section 51,144 for reversing that portion of the Sheldon opinion.  
The Second Circuit acknowledged Martin’s argument but it remanded 
the case with a compromise: 
Unlike the district court, we are not prepared to abandon the teachings 
of Sheldon in favor of a hard and fast rule denying all overhead 
deductions to willful infringers.  But we share the district court’s 
concern that willful infringers should not be permitted to subsidize the 
sale of legitimate goods with the sale of infringing goods by "passing 
part of its fixed cost on to the copyright holder."  We also recognize that 
"a rule of liability which merely takes away profits from an infringement 
would offer little discouragement to infringers."  We therefore conclude 
that Sheldon’s two-step approach must be applied with particular rigor 
in the case of willful infringement.145 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 241 (Tex. 1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt. a, b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)). 
 140. See id. at 241 n.45. 
 141. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), aff’d, 309 
U.S. 390 (1940); Hamil Am., Inc. v. SGS Studio, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 386, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 142. See Hamil Am., Inc. v. G.F.I., 193 F.3d 92, 108–09 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the lower court erroneously barred the defendant from deducting expenses and reversing in 
part for a recalculation of damages). 
 143. See Roach, supra note 17, at 556–68 (discussing Sheldon and Hamil). 
 144. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (discussing remedies that deny the 
incentive to infringe). 
 145. Hamil, 193 F.3d at 106–07 (citations omitted). 
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The gist of the compromise is simple:  After applying "rigorous scrutiny" 
to the defendant’s proposed counter-restitution, Judge Martin is 
authorized to reject the proposed expenses, but, in the meantime, the 
Second Circuit avoids having to overturn part of Sheldon.  The difference 
between scrutiny and rigorous scrutiny, however, seems at best 
metaphysical unless it is just another form of equitable discretion. The 
Third Restatement, however, supports the Hamill opinion, inexplicably 
concluding that the Second Circuit "reviewed the extensive authorities 
permitting deductions from profits on account of allocable overhead."146 
The second line of cases follows from a research error in Sheldon.147  
Comment b of Section 158 of the First Restatement provides that the 
willful or fraudulent defendant is entitled to reimbursement for the 
payment of taxes or satisfying other liens on the property.148  Comment d 
of Section 158 states that such a defendant’s expenditures for capital 
improvements are not entitled to reimbursement (presumably as an 
extension of the mistaken improvement doctrine).149  Judge Hand 
juxtaposed capital improvements with expense and advised that trustee 
expenses could not be reimbursed.150  Judge Hand’s analysis was not even 
a fair statement in 1948 of the law relating to indemnity for disloyal 
trustees.151 
                                                                                                                 
 146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. i (2011).  
 147. See Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 51 (stating that "a constructive trustee, who consciously 
misappropriates the property of another, is often refused allowance even of actual 
expenses").  Note that the Second Circuit’s opinion was affirmed by the Supreme Court, but 
the Supreme Court expressed no opinion on specific issues relating to offsetting expenses, 
which were dismissed as questions of fact.  See also F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary 
Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 234 (1962) (distinguishing its set of facts from those in Sheldon).  
 148. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION:  RULES GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO 
ACTIONS FOR RESTITUTION § 158 cmt. b (1937) ("[I]f a person by fraud obtains title to land 
subject to mortgage and pays the mortgage, he is entitled to compensation for such payment 
upon being required to surrender the land."). 
 149. See id. § 158 cmt. d (1937) ("The conscious wrongdoer is ordinarily not allowed 
compensation for an improvement or addition . . . .  This is consistent with the rule of 
damages in [conversion] actions . . . in which case the . . . wrongdoer is required to pay for 
the full value of the chattel as improved by him before demand for its return."). 
 150. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Hand’s erroneous 
rationale Sheldon). 
 151. See Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry. Co., 78 F. Supp. 312, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) 
(discussing what traffic expenses, if any, can be set off against the judgment); see also Lewis 
v. Ingram, 57 F.2d 463, 465 (10th Cir. 1932) ("An unfaithful trustee is not entitled to any 
compensation for his services. . . .  It does not, however, follow that he forfeits moneys 
advanced by him to the trust fund." (citations omitted)). 
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Judge Hand’s dicta had no impact on his opinion because he allowed 
practically all of the counter-restitution that MGM could devise.  The 
dicta did cause some trouble for subsequent cases.152  Where the First 
Restatement stated that capital improvements by willful defendants were 
not entitled to counter-restitution, the plaintiff in a Ninth Circuit case 
quoted the Second Circuit opinion in Sheldon for the proposition that "a 
court may automatically deny a willful infringer any deduction from profits 
of overhead expenses."153  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
correctly rejected the plaintiff’s claim by pointing out that the Second 
Circuit found the defendant in Sheldon to have acted willfully, but still 
allowed allocated overhead.154  However the Ninth Circuit volunteered that 
"[a] portion of an infringer’s overhead properly may be deducted from 
gross revenues to arrive at profits, at least where the infringement was not 
willful, conscious, or deliberate."155  This dictum had little effect on the 
Ninth Circuit, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted 
the theory.156 
While the common law remedy of an accounting in equity requires 
proof of willfulness to warrant the award of the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment,157 there is no legal doctrine to justify the notion that any 
                                                                                                                 
 152. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1939) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 158 cmt. d (1937)).  For cases quoting the 
misstatement favorably, see Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852 
("A constructive trustee who consciously misappropriates the property of another is often 
refused allowance even of his actual expenses."). 
 153. Kamar Int’l., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 752 F.2d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 515 (9th Cir. 
1985) (citing Kamar, 752 F.2d at 1331).  
 156. See Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Overhead may not be 
deducted from gross revenues to arrive at profits when an infringement was deliberate or 
willful." (citing Frank Music, 772 F.2d at 515)); see also Mfrs. Techs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 
728 F. Supp. 75, 84 (D. Conn. 1989) (rejecting allocated portions of overhead due to the 
willfulness of the defendant’s infringement, without referring to the opinions in the Second 
Circuit or Ninth Circuit); Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14132, at *25 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that defendant’s willfulness precluded the deduction 
of allocation overhead but that the defendant waived its right to appeal that ruling). 
 157. See PALMER, supra note 40, § 2.12, at 164 (stating that, for trademark 
infringement, "an innocent infringer usually is not held accountable for profits"); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (2011) (distinguishing 
"wrongdoer" from "conscious wrongdoer"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 37 (1995) (stating that one can be liable for net profits resulting from unlawful conduct if 
the actor engages in intentional conduct to confuse or deceive); id. § 45 (stating that an 
award of monetary relief depends on the "intent and knowledge of the actor and the nature 
and extent of any good faith reliance by the actor"). 
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particular offset credit depends on the defendant’s willfulness.158  The Third 
Restatement provides the exception that only a defendant’s conscious or 
willful actions warrant the remedy of profit disgorgement.159  Furthermore, 
conditioning counter-restitution on the defendant’s willfulness proves either 
too much or too little.  Offsetting the defendant’s revenues for fixed costs is 
either a reasonable or unreasonable measure of the defendant’s advantage, 
depending on whether you subscribe to the full absorption or incremental 
cost approaches.  Denying allocations of fixed costs only against willful 
defendants is overtly punitive and contradicts Section 42 of the Third 
Restatement.160 
VIII.  Gross Disgorgement Cases 
Property law interrupts the continuity of remedies in equity by 
providing for the equivalent of specific restitution for the conversion of 
personal property without counter-restitution for beneficial expenses.  The 
First and Third Restatements provide for counter-restitution of beneficial 
expenses for real property, but counter-restitution for capital expenditures is 
controlled by the equitable considerations associated with mistaken 
improvements.161  Neither of these doctrines apply to the misappropriation 
of intellectual property or other forms of intangible property because, even 
today, many jurisdictions hold that such intangibles cannot be converted.162  
At least one British authority asserts that accident plays a significant role in 
the distinct forms of restitution for differing types of property.163 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1169 n.2 (W.D. Wash. 1999) 
(arguing that case law does not require or justify barring a defendant from putting on 
evidence regarding overhead costs and that such evidence must be admissible); In re Indep. 
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1251 (D. Kan. 1998) ("The court finds that 
the deductibility of [the defendant’s] fixed overhead costs does not depend on whether [the 
defendant’s] infringement was willful or not."). 
 159. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 cmt. c 
(2011) ("When the defendant has acted in conscious disregard of the claimant’s rights, the 
whole of any resulting gain is treated as unjust enrichment, even though the defendant’s gain 
may exceed both (i) the measurable injury to the plaintiff, and (ii) the reasonable value of 
license authorizing the defendant’s conduct."). 
 160. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. i 
(2011) (discussing punitive accounting). 
 161. See id. § 40 (discussing equitable remedies for trespass and conversion). 
 162. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that most states do not recognize 
a conversion claim for intangible property). 
 163. See Her Majesty’s Attorney General v. Blake, [2001] 1. A.C. 268 (H.L.).  Lord 
Nicholls concluded that the difference in remedies for intellectual property and tangible 
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The gross disgorgement cases relating to trespass to precious minerals 
or resources is an amalgam of rationales, but generally hold that an 
intentional trespass to timber, coal, oil, gold and other scarce resources 
should be remedied by the disgorgement of revenues, generally without 
reimbursement for operating or development expenses.164  Holdings vary as 
to what stage in the development/refinery process the minerals have to be 
valued and how much, if any, of the mining, development or refining costs 
can be passed on to the plaintiff; but it is not uncommon for the willful 
defendant to receive no counter-restitution for the principal exploration and 
development costs of bringing the minerals to the surface.  Current case law 
is largely dictated by various state statutes, but the Third Restatement also 
acknowledges this doctrine as a generalization of the case law.165  The 
origin of this widely-practiced exception to counter-restitution has varied 
rationales: denying counter-restitution as outside public policy;166 awarding 
the financial equivalent of specific restitution, similar to converted personal 
property;167 and even one set of cases in which the English judge admitted 
wanting to punish the defendant.168 
                                                                                                                 
property is a happenstance of history:   
Considered as a matter of principle, it is difficult to see why equity required the 
wrongdoer to account for all his profits in these cases, whereas the common 
law’s response was to require a wrongdoer merely to pay a reasonable fee for 
use of another’s land or goods.  In all these cases rights of property were 
infringed.  This difference in remedial response appears to have arisen simply as 
an accident of history.   
Id. at 280. 
 164. For the majority rule on conversion of personal property and trespass to minerals, 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 (2011). 
 165. Id.  See generally V. Woerner, Right of Trespasser to Credit for Expenditures in 
Producing, As Against His Liability For Value of , Oil or Minerals, 21 A.L.R.2d 380 (1952). 
 166. See E.E. Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 434 (1882) (denying 
restitution of logging expenses for timber converted in national forests). 
 167. See Ripy v. Less, 188 S.W. 1084, 1086 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) (debating the 
appropriate time of conversion for timber, and stating that it depends on the circumstances of 
each case). 
 168. Modern English authorities state that the more appropriate precedent is actually 
Martin v. Porter, 151 Eng. Rep. 149 (Ex. Ct. 1839), and is regarded as a punitive measure.  
See also EDELMAN, supra note 63, at 138 (discussing Martin, an English case in which the 
court refused to give allowance for the work done in order to punish and deter willful 
trespasses). 
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A.  Fraud 
In contrast to Palmer169 and Dobbs,170 the Third Restatement maintains 
that defendants in willful fraud claims should be denied counter-restitution for 
direct costs.  Comment h of Section 51 of the Third Restatement advises that 
"[t]he defendant will not be allowed a credit for the direct expenses of an 
attempt to defraud the claimant, even if these expenses produce some benefit to 
the claimant."171  The Comment is an example of a disloyal real estate agent 
who makes a secret profit from the plaintiff, and the Illustration concludes that 
the agent should disgorge the profit without offsetting credit for the real estate 
commission or any reasonable expenses.  While the Restatement’s assertion 
may be true in some circumstances, it is not true in all circumstances, nor is it 
fully supported by the cases cited.172  The cases cited in the Third Restatement 
support the doctrine that disloyal agents are subject to forfeiting their fees and 
to disgorging their secret profits; they do not necessarily deny substantiated, 
reasonable expenses incurred for the benefit of the plaintiff.  Section 403 of the 
Restatement of Agency is also offered for support, but it has already been 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See PALMER, supra note 40, § 3.11, at 294 ("When goods or services have been 
exchanged pursuant to contract, and the plaintiff seeks restitution of the value he transferred, 
it will generally be necessary for him to return or otherwise account for the value he 
received.").  Palmer further stated, "This will be true whether his right to restitution is based 
on fraud, innocent misrepresentation, breach of contract, mistake or any other ground."  Id. 
 170. See DOBBS, supra note 46, § 9.3(1), at 579–81 (stating that as a part of rescission 
or restitution from the defendant to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is required to make restitution 
to the defendant for assets or services received from the defendant); id. § 9.3(3), at 593 
("However, the plaintiff must account to the defendant only for actual benefits received 
when the transaction is avoided."). 
 171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. h 
(2011). 
 172. The case of Ward v. Taggert, 336 P.2d 534 (Cal. 1959), involved a claim at law 
for which the court ordered the disgorgement of the agent’s profit and fee, but denied the 
defendant’s expenses on the basis that some expenses were unnecessary and the remaining 
expenses were unsubstantiated by the defendant.  Id. at 539.  The case of Ellison v. Alley, 
842 S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. 1992), merely held that a disloyal real estate agent had to disgorge 
his fee.  Id. at 706–08 ("We are in agreement with the finding of breach of fiduciary duty and 
the award to the plaintiff of the defendant’s profits.  But, on the narrow issue upon which 
this appeal was granted, we find that the defendants are not entitled to a commission on the 
sale of [property].").  In Lestoque v. M.R. Mansfield Realty, Inc., 536 P.2d 1146 (Colo. App. 
1975), a case for breach of fiduciary duty by a real estate agent, the court found liability only 
for breach of fiduciary duty and not for fraud.  Id. at 1148–50 (denying the claim for fraud 
and awarding the agent’s secret profit and commission to be disgorged, refusing to offset the 
agent’s expenses because they were unnecessary for the underlying transaction). 
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shown that section has received little support and is over-ruled by the 
specificity of Section 439.173 
Generally, the holding on counter-restitution in fraud cases depends on 
two issues:  The extent of the defendant’s fraudulent activities as a percent 
of the defendant’s total activities, and whether the expenses relate to a 
transaction or an operating business.  Any infringing expenses related to the 
actual fraud should be excluded on the grounds of public policy.  The fraud-
feasor’s services are certainly in jeopardy, but even they have been credited 
to the defendant. 
Transactional and other expenses incurred to induce the fraud are 
regularly excluded, and capital improvements can be excluded, as explained 
in Comment d of Section 158 of the First Restatement.174  The remaining 
expenses are effectively grouped into incidental transaction expenses or the 
operating expenses and capital expenditures for maintaining real estate or a 
business.  Incidental transaction expenses are somewhat vulnerable, but 
Illustration 21 in Section 51 of the Third Restatement overstates the 
practice by asserting that an unfaithful agent has no claim to beneficial, out-
of-pocket expenses.175  There is a substantial group of cases that allow 
incidental expenses as counter-restitution, both in real estate cases (as 
previously discussed in relation to Section 403 of the Restatement of 
Agency176) and most cases related to claims by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trade Commission 
(CFTC) described below.177 
Dan Dobbs notes the distinction between transaction costs and 
expenses for business operations: 
Rents received are treated as income produced by the property itself 
rather than income produced by the efforts of the defendant.  That is, the 
transaction costs in renting out the property are ignored, and the 
defendant receives no credit for his efforts in securing a tenant.  This 
corresponds with the general practice of courts in other kinds of cases 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See supra notes 87–101 and accompanying text (discussing the infringing trustee’s 
right to indemnity). 
 174. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 158 cmt. d (1937) (addressing how to 
compensate a willful wrongdoer for improvements and additions to the subject matter). 
 175. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 illus. 21 
(2011). 
 176. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 177. See infra notes 224–27 and accompanying text (discussing SEC and CFTC 
caselaw). 
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involving simple market transactions, as distinct from those involving 
operation of an ongoing business.178 
Therefore, if the plaintiff seeks the defendant’s business profits, counter-
restitution is likely available for some, if not all, of the defendant’s 
expenses or expenditures.  On the other hand, if the plaintiff is seeking the 
defendant’s profit or gain on the sale of a specific asset, it is unlikely but 
possible that a court will approve the offset of related expenses.  The 
question remains, however, whether legitimate and substantiated business 
expenses must be denied for certain types of transactions. 
The Third Restatement implicitly acknowledges the distinction 
between transaction and business operating expenses, as it evaluates 
counter-restitution for business operating expenses in three fraud 
illustrations according to the benefit principle for trustee indemnity.  The 
fraud example in Illustration 22 in Section 51 and Illustrations 7 and 8 for 
breach of fiduciary duty in Section 43 relate to business operation resulting 
from fraud and constructive fraud, yet the Third Restatement expresses no 
reservations about operating expenses.  The only issue appears to be 
whether the fraud-feasor warrants counter-restitution for his personal 
services.179 
Illustration 22 in Section 51 of the Third Restatement is based on a 
Pennsylvania fraud case in which the court allowed offsetting credit for 
business operating expenses and salary compensation for the fraud-feasor.  
The Third Restatement attempts to distinguish the holding in that case from 
its rule against counter-restitution for fraud-feasors on the basis of avoiding 
an injustice, which is another term for equitable discretion.180  Dobbs 
provides a more constrained and defined rationale by explaining that the 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See DOBBS, supra note 46, § 9.3(4), at 601; see also Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. JT 
Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that certain 
"necessary" business expenses, such as commissions, telephone charges, and underwriting 
expenses, are deductible regardless of the defendant’s scheme); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. 
Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 95 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that even though 
markup costs and expenses should be deductible, securities law violators may not insulate 
certain profits from disgorgement, and "a court may consider as an offset the expenses 
incurred by defendant in garnering such unjust enrichment"). 
 179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 illus. 22 
(2011) (illustrating what happens when one party induces another party to sell a chain of 
retail stores at a grossly inadequate price by making fraudulent misrepresentations); id. § 43 
illus. 7 (presenting a scenario in which an attorney competes against a former client and 
thereby breaches his fiduciary obligations); id. § 43 illus. 8 (describing a situation in which a 
geologist misappropriates his former employers’ confidential information and thereby 
violating his fiduciary duty). 
 180. See id. § 51 cmt. h (referencing Brooks v. Conston, 72 A.2d 75 (Pa. 1950)). 
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holding is the result of the court’s determination that the husband’s services 
warranted compensation because he benefitted the value of the plaintiff’s 
business.181 
B.  Outlaws 
To borrow Professor Kull’s term, are there civil "outlaws" who should 
not be protected by a court in equity?182  His article explains that courts 
regularly take negative action or fail to take action—such as to deny 
counter-restitution to certain outlaws, including plaintiffs with unclean 
hands.183  While their authority is only persuasive, British authorities on the 
issue agree that "wicked" or willful defendants still should be eligible for 
counter-restitution,184 except when it would violate public policy based on 
the nature of the counter-restitution.185 
Frank Snepp is generally on everyone’s list of potential outlaws, 
especially as a comparison to the British case on Blake.186  Snepp breached 
his fiduciary duty to his employer, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
by publishing a book of "memoirs" about CIA operations during the 
Vietnam War and thereby revealing confidential CIA information—
although not necessarily information that jeopardized national security.187  
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order for all of Snepp’s 
book royalties to be deemed a constructive trust.188  After the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See DOBBS, supra note 46, § 9.3(4), at 602 n.42 ("The defendant’s efforts are 
properly ignored if they yielded no actual benefit to the plaintiff . . . .  On the other hand, if 
the defendant provided services required by the transaction that is now avoided, the value of 
those services should be credited to the defendant." (citing PALMER, supra note 40, § 3.12, at 
304)). 
 182. See Kull, supra note 1, at 30 (referring to claimants in restitution cases as outlaws 
due to their treatment by courts).  
 183. See id. at 31 ("[R]estitution . . . will sometimes treat the claimant’s bad behavior as 
an affirmative defense."). 
 184. See ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 176 (2d ed. 2005) ("‘Though 
the defendant has been fraudulent, he must not be robbed, nor must the plaintiff be unjustly 
enriched, as he would be if he both got back what he had parted with and kept what he had 
received in return.’" (citations omitted)). 
 185. See PETER BIRKS, RESTITUTION—THE FUTURE 128–32 (1992) (stating that even 
"wicked" defendants receive counter-restitution, except when the defendant’s reimbursement 
would be against public policy). 
 186. See generally United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Her Majesty’s 
Attorney General v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268. 
 187. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508–09 (discussing the background facts of the case). 
 188. See id. at 768–69. 
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Court reversed the court of appeals decision and remanded the case, the 
district judge allowed counter-restitution only for Snepp’s income taxes, 
which may have been required by the fact that the plaintiff was the same 
federal government that received his income taxes.189  As with the motion 
practice for most constructive trusts, there is no published opinion on 
whether Snepp’s reasonable expenses, if any, were rejected out of public 
policy or for other reasons.  On the other hand, it is difficult to read the 
Snepp and Blake opinions without suspecting that the legal process in both 
their cases was "goal-seeking"—motivated by national security fears with 
respect to Snepp and by the desire to punish or spite in any way possible 
with respect to Blake.190 
Equitable discretion is a necessary factor in a thorough analysis of 
measuring remedies in equity.191  Few bodies of case opinions from courts 
in equity can avoid acknowledging equitable discretion as a source of 
unpredictability or a source of what physicists call Brownian motion.192  
Owing to the origins and goals of courts in equity, their discretion is more 
accepted on a policy level and given wider margin.  The boundaries for 
equitable discretion are wide enough to include or ‘swallow’ the outlaw 
issue.193   
In summary, gross disgorgement for conversion of personal property 
and trespass to minerals are confirmed exceptions to the proposed rule for 
counter-restitution.  The remaining exceptions can be explained mostly by 
concerns about public policy and the vagaries of equitable discretion. 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See FRANK SNEPP, IRREPARABLE HARM:  A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF HOW ONE 
AGENT TOOK ON THE CIA IN AN EPIC BATTLE OVER SECRECY AND FREE SPEECH 357 (1st ed. 
1999) ("Four months after the Supreme Court had spoken, Sally Whitaker announced that I 
would be required to surrender all my royalties minus only federal income taxes within 
forty-five days."). 
 190. See DOBBS, supra note 46, § 4.1(3), at 565 (discussing procedures that give the 
plaintiff restitution by giving her title to, or a security interest in particular property, or 
giving her the rights formerly held by another person). 
 191. See generally Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following 
eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63 (2007). 
 192. See generally ALBERT EINSTEIN, INVESTIGATION ON THE THEORY OF BROWNIAN 
MOVEMENT (1956). 
 193. See Rendleman, supra note 191, at 65 ("Courts make extravagant statements about 
their discretion in administering equitable substantive standards."). 
COUNTER-RESTITUTION 1309 
IX.  FTC Claims for Gross Disgorgement194 
"‘Plaintiff,’ the tobacco companies protested, ‘apparently believes that 
the more confusing he makes the law of restitution and indemnity 
appear, the higher his likelihood of success.’"195 
Federal agency claims in equity, especially those of the FTC and FDA, 
comprise a body of cases in which the courts regularly award gross 
disgorgement.  Based on weak research that cites inapposite precedents, the 
misuse of key terms, and the sympathy of many courts that appear to be 
solicitous of the agency’s mandate, some district courts are awarding non-
traditional remedies that are entirely outside the courts’ jurisdiction.196  
Equally important are many courts’ mistaken holdings that the remedy of 
consumer redress is a reasonable measure of an equity remedy.197  As most 
of the opinions have been affirmed in some circuit courts, this situation may 
continue to grow without reversal by the Supreme Court or Congress. 
Almost ninety years after Root v. Railway Co.,198 the Supreme Court 
expanded the doctrine of implied jurisdiction to statutes for federal 
agencies.  In Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,199 the Supreme Court held that 
the full range of remedies in equity is implicit in Congress’s grant of 
injunctive relief to federal agencies.200  Sixteen years later, the full range of 
remedies in equity was implied in statutes without specific provision for 
injunctive relief except when the remedy would be contrary to the intent of 
Congress.201  The cases were of small note, but they were the foundation for 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Any disagreement that this article might display with the FTC’s interpretation of 
the doctrine of remedies in equity or the FTC’s tactics in pursuing its duties is not intended 
to belittle the challenge that the FTC faces in undertaking its role as chief federal 
"prosecutor" for consumer fraud. 
 195. Rendleman, supra note 47, at 884 (quoting S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 335 (2d ed. 1981)). 
 196. See Roach, supra note 17, at 543–56 (discussing federal agency claims). 
 197. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380 
(D. Conn. 2009) (measuring restitution by consumer redress). 
 198. See Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 216 (1881) (holding that 
there are no grounds for the equitable relief sought and dismissing the complaint). 
 199. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946) (holding that the 
district court erred in declining to consider whether restitution was necessary or proper); see 
also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (noting that the appropriate court may 
issue whatever order is proper to enforce compliance). 
 200. See Porter, 328 U.S. at 399–400 ("The traditional equity powers of a court remain 
unimpaired in a proceeding . . . so that an order of restitution can be made."). 
 201. See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1960) 
("When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibition contained in a 
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the Second Circuit opinion in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co.,202 which lead to implied jurisdiction in equity for federal 
agencies such as the SEC, CFTC, FTC, Department of Energy, Department 
of Labor, and FDA, among others, to seek monetary remedies in equity.203  
Except for some claims of the SEC after 2000,204 the sole basis for the 
federal agencies to seek monetary remedies in equity was each agency’s 
statutory jurisdiction to seek injunctive relief. 
Recently, the Supreme Court confirmed that remedies for claims in 
equity are limited to the standards for remedies in equity that were practiced 
in England or the American colonies before 1789.205  In 2006, the Second 
Circuit implemented the limitation on remedies in equity by initiating a 
"Grupo analysis" to determine if the proposed remedy in equity was in 
general practice prior to 1789.206  The Supreme Court opinions of the 
nineteenth century may provide some reasonable approximations of those 
standards. 
Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.207 raised a 
minor issue that is sometimes raised in agency cases to attempt to expand 
                                                                                                                 
regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of 
equity to provide complete relief in the light of statutory purposes."). 
 202. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1310 (2d 
Cir. 1971) (holding that the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded with 
respect to an order cancelling stock options).  
 203. See id. at 1307–08 (discussing whether restitution can be applied under equity 
powers by federal agencies). 
 204. As of 2000, there is statutory authority for awarding some SEC claims with "tier 3 
civil penalties," which specifically allows for the disgorgement of the defendant’s gross 
proceeds.  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2)(C) (2006); Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) . 
 205. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 
318 (1999); see also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975) (stating that 
equity jurisdiction was a method for the Chancellor to establish equity as necessitated by 
each individual case).  For a slightly different standard, see Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. 
Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 362 (2006) ("[W]e examined cases and secondary legal materials 
to determine if the relief would have been equitable ‘in the days of the divided bench.’") 
(citations omitted). 
 206. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(providing a historical discussion of disgorgement); see also Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. 
Supp. 2d 684, 702–03 (S.D. Tex. 2002), consolidated by 206 F.R.D. 427 (S.D. Tex. 2002), 
aff’d, 302 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing restitutionary remedies in the chancery courts 
of England). 
 207. See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 335 (holding that the district court did not have authority to 
issue a preliminary injunction because such a remedy was historically unavailable from a 
court of equity). 
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the boundaries of an agency’s monetary remedies in equity.208  The litigants 
in Grupo, Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson209 and 
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.210 were companies or 
individuals, not government agencies.211  Dicta in Grupo implies that the 
range of available remedies in equity is broader for government claims 
than private parties.212  However, a comparison of the range of remedies 
provided in Stevens v. Gladding213 for individual plaintiffs does not 
immediately appear to be different from that in Mitchell v. Robert 
DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,214 nor does it seem sufficient to justify exempting 
federal agency claims from Grupo’s boundaries for remedies in equity.215  
To date, the Second Circuit opinion in Securities & Exchange 
Commission v. Cavanagh216 manifests that circuit’s belief that SEC claims 
are not exempt.217 
                                                                                                                 
 208. See id. at 326 ("[C]ourts of equity will ‘go much farther both to give and withhold 
relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private 
interests are involved.’") (quoting United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 383 
(1965); Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 118 n.29 ("Because the challenged remedy awarded in this 
case was available to private equity in plaintiffs chancery in 1789, we need not, and do not, 
decide today what additional latitude a federal court might have in awarding equitable 
remedies . . . .") (emphasis included); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 2011 
U.S. App. LEXIS 17203, at *31 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[D]isgorgement is a distinctly public-
regarding remedy, available only to government entities seeking to enforce explicit statutory 
provisions . . . ."). 
 209. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 234 (2002) 
(holding that provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act authorizing plan 
participants and fiduciaries to bring civil actions to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" did 
not authorize employee benefit plan to bring action for specific performance of 
reimbursement provision of plan). 
 210. See Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2006) 
(concluding that fiduciary was seeking equitable relief and could maintain action under 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act provision authorizing "appropriate equitable 
relief"). 
 211. See Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 356; Knudson, 534 U.S at 204; Grupo, 527 U.S. at 308. 
 212. See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 326 (stating that courts of equity will apply broader 
remedies when the public interest is at issue instead of private interests). 
 213. See Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447, 454 (1855) (concluding that that the Act of 
1819 did not extend equity powers of the courts to the adjudication of forfeitures and 
rejecting the prayer of relief). 
 214. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 303 (1960) 
(concluding that the district court has jurisdiction to order an employer to reimburse 
employees, unlawfully discharged or otherwise discriminated against, for wages lost because 
of that discharge or discrimination). 
 215. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 453–55; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 299–301. 
 216. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 121 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding 
that district court had authority to impose equitable remedy of disgorgement); see also Fed. 
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This argument also overlooks the difference in jurisdiction between 
Grupo and most agency cases.  The plaintiff’s jurisdiction in Grupo was 
in equity, and the Grupo issue relates to latitude provided to the 
government for a claim in equity.  Generally, federal agency claims enjoy 
only implied jurisdiction and seek remedies ancillary to injunctive relief.  
In Tull v. United States,218 the Supreme Court implies that ancillary 
remedies should be less significant than the injunctive relief.219  This 
implication would need to be reconciled with Porter and Mitchell, which 
both held that in the absence of expressed congressional intent, the 
plaintiff agency is entitled to the full range of remedies in equity in 
implied jurisdiction.220  The issue was not addressed in Cavanagh and the 
resolution of this conflict is not as important as the implication that 
Grupo’s dicta may not apply to federal agency cases based on implied 
jurisdiction. 
A federal agency has implied statutory jurisdiction in equity 
whenever Congress passes a statute that authorizes injunctive relief.  
Ancillary to injunctive relief, the agency is free to seek monetary or other 
equitable remedies so long as the relevant statutes do not specifically 
preclude such remedies.  Even if the agency jurisdiction is authorized by 
two separate statutes, one that provides for a group of remedies including 
some equitable remedies and one that provides only for injunctive relief, 
the agency has sufficient implied jurisdiction to seek the full range of 
equitable remedies (subject to the Grupo limitations) under the latter 
provision. 
Especially in FTC and FDA cases, the agencies sometimes juxtapose 
terms for restitution/unjust enrichment/disgorgement/equitable remedy 
and profit/benefit/gain/receipts to great advantage for their policies.  In 
prior articles, I have shown how opinions for the FTC justify gross 
disgorgement with precedents that discuss only profit disgorgement or 
                                                                                                                 
Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17203, at *31 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 217. See id. at 117 ("[D]isgorgement has been used by the SEC and courts to prevent 
wrongdoers from unjustly enriching themselves through violations, which has the effect of 
deterring substantial fraud."). 
 218. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987) (concluding the Clean Water 
Act does not guarantee jury trial to assess civil penalties under the Act). 
 219. See id. at 424 (stating that "a court in equity was empowered to provide monetary 
awards that were incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief," but a court in equity 
cannot enforce civil penalties). 
 220. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 290–93 (1960) 
(quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1946).  
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disgorgement by default.221  So far, evidence of prosecutorial 
aggressiveness222 and even agency misconduct is rare,223 but the agencies 
take great liberties with terminology and inapposite precedent. 
Case opinions relating to claims by the more experienced agencies 
like the SEC224 and the CFTC225 are stabilizing in terms of counter-
restitution.  Neither agency seriously disputed that the cost for the 
underlying security or commodity contract must be offset if the security 
was not worthless and therefore never fully rejected counter-restitution.  
The Second Circuit’s underlying commitment to apportionment and offset 
for the reasonable cost of the underlying security was clear in Texas Gulf 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 17, at 543–56 (discussing federal agency claims). 
 222. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *24 
n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The SEC often takes a broad view as to what constitutes illicit 
profits. . . .  In contrast, the courts tend to take a more realistic approach as to what 
constitutes ‘illegal’ profits, and have accepted the propriety of netting gains and losses.").  
 223. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1199 (10th 
Cir. 2005) ("The district court’s separate judgment specifically stated the FTC’s ‘prosecution 
of this action has been undertaken in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly and for oppressive 
reasons.’") (citations omitted). 
 224. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1114 
(9th Cir. 2006) (discussing the deduction of business and operating expenses); Secs. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 88 F. App’x 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming 
the disgorgement amount awarded); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Alliance Leasing Corp., 28 F. 
App’x 648, 652 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the SEC correctly calculated the disgorgement 
value); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d 
Cir. 1978) (discussing the computation of disgorgement); Secs. Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 
F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating the purpose of disgorgement is to deprive the 
wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain"); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. U.S. Env’tl., Inc., 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12580, at *75–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that a court can deduct direct 
transaction costs from illegal profits); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bocchino, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22047, at *6–7 (addressing the deduction of certain expenses from gross profits 
incurred while garnering the illegal profits); McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *14 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating brokerage commissions should be deducted); Secs. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Rosenfeld, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing the 
deduction of brokerage commissions); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hughes, 917 F. Supp. 
1080, 1086–87 (D.N.J. 1996) (approving of the disgorgement amount ordered without a 
hearing); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Dilip Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *14 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing brokerage commissions). 
 225. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 531 
F.3d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The equitable remedy of restitution does not take into 
consideration the plaintiff’s losses, but only focuses on the defendant’s unjust enrichment."); 
Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 77 n.10 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (discussing the distinction between "profits" and "proceeds"); Commodities 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Avco Fin. Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996, at *3–5 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (dissecting all revenues and costs associated with the defendant’s activity). 
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Sulphur, as was its concern to avoid awarding a punitive remedy.226  Since 
Texas Gulf Sulphur, the SEC in particular has tried to resist additional 
counter-restitution for indirect or direct expenses with varying degrees of 
success, but it has begun to admit that some direct expenses can be included 
in counter-restitution.227  Disputes in measuring monetary remedies in 
equity asserted by the SEC or the CFTC no longer dispute counter-
restitution as a matter of law, only questions of fact about individual 
categories.  As a result, this Article will principally focus on the claims of 
the FTC and the FDA.  
Implied jurisdiction in equity has literally transformed FTC operations.  
Once the FTC realized the advantages of such litigation over the normal 
administrative law process, the FTC reduced its administrative law cases 
and redirected those resources into federal litigation for injunctive and other 
equitable remedies.228  The advantages of federal litigation are substantial.  
Like the SEC and CFTC, the FTC has become an expert plaintiff or 
prosecutor in a litigation process that is foreign to many lawyers.  The 
injunctive relief is not new, but the monetary remedies in equity are foreign 
to many defendants’ lawyers and even jurists.  The confusing vocabulary 
and obscure legal doctrine suggest a long learning curve and the 
opportunity for experienced "prosecutors" to "push" defense counsel and 
the bench. 
The FTC has filed an average of eighty to ninety cases per year for the 
last ten years or more.229  The range of annual total awards of unjust 
enrichment has ranged from $300 million to $900 million per year.230  On 
the basis of a survey of cases from January 2007 to October 1, 2010, it was 
                                                                                                                 
 226. See Secs. Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–09 (2d 
Cir. 1971) (stating that the SEC can seek remedial relief other than an injunction so long as it 
is not a penalty assessment). 
 227. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. McCaskey, No. 98-CV-6153, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4915, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (confirming that courts can deduct from disgorgement 
direct transaction costs such as brokerage commissions). 
 228. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Office of the Gen. Counsel, A Brief Overview of the 
Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority (2002), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm ("The courts have uniformly accepted 
the Commission’s construction of Section 13(b), with the result that most consumer 
protection enforcement is now conducted directly in court under Section 13(b), rather than 
by means of administrative adjudication."). 
 229. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 17, at 544 ("[F]ederal agencies have filed a growing 
number of claims for large amount of unjust enrichment.  For example, in 2003, the FTC 
filed about 90 claims . . . ."). 
 230. See id. (stating that in 2003, the FTC won in award and in settlement 
approximately $900 million). 
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determined that more than ten FTC lawyers had filed more than ten cases 
during that period, and that more than twenty had worked on more than 
five.  Over that same time period, the average defense counsel has worked 
on less than two cases.  The data in that period also suggest that the FTC 
practices venue shopping as it is a frequent filer in the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits.  These two federal circuits account for about 55% of dollar 
awards.  Few cases are filed in the Second or Fifth Circuits.231 
While the award per case is an impressive $4 million to $10 million, 
the distribution of cases is skewed in terms of size.  The top seven or eight 
cases generally account for more than 80% of the total annual amount.  The 
annual average size of the remaining cases is generally less than $1 million.  
Settled or stipulated verdicts are very common and the rate of injunctive 
relief appears high.  From anecdotal notes in FTC reports it appears that 
defendants to FTC settlements and awards are often financially unable to 
fund the monetary award and must seek reductions from the FTC or 
bankruptcy protection.232  Personal liability for the principals is frequently 
in dispute.  The mass action aspects of FTC litigation discourage rescission 
or counter-restitution in kind.  It would be reasonable to surmise that a 
defendant might readily settle for an injunction and a moderate monetary 
award rather than face the prospect of defending a claim for a large claim 
for gross disgorgement in a district court that has previously agreed to 
follow the FTC’s aggressive theory of monetary damages in equity.233 
Federal Trade Commission v. Stefanchik234 is a somewhat extreme 
example of how a remedy is measured and defined for the FTC.  John 
Stefanchik and his corporation, Beringer Corporation, originated the 
"Stefanchik Program," as explained in a book and supporting materials, 
which prescribed methods for novices to achieve substantial wealth by 
                                                                                                                 
 231. This assertion is based on recent research conducted by author based on PACER 
data.  For prior research on FTC venue shopping, see Roach, supra note 110, at 117. 
 232. See Federal Trade Commission Annual Report, April 2010, 55–63 (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/2010ChairmansReport.pdf (summarizing order 
enforcement, bankruptcy collections, and supporting criminal prosecutions). 
 233. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th 
Cir. 2005) ("According to the court, the FTC made ‘exorbitant and unsupported settlement 
demands’ based on false claims it could prove damages against Haroldsen in the amount of 
$150 million through the testimony of hundreds of injured consumers prepared to testify as 
to defendants’ deceptive acts and practices."). 
 234. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that the district court did not err in holding defendants liable for the total 
amount of loss incurred by consumers). 
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buying and selling private mortgages.235  Stefanchik and Beringer received 
a royalty of 15% to 22% of the revenues of an independent marketing 
agent, Atlas Marketing, Inc., which promoted and sold the book as well as 
marketed a sizable dollar amount of supporting services.236  There is no 
indication in the Ninth Circuit opinion of any affiliation between Stefanchik 
and Atlas or Justin Ely, who owned Atlas.  The FTC reached settlements 
with all defendants except Stefanchik and Beringer. 
The district court entered a disgorgement order against Stefanchik in 
the amount of Atlas’s revenues for the program.237  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the remedy with the following explanation that is startling in both 
its breadth and depth of mischaracterizing remedies in equity: 
We are unpersuaded by the defendants’ assertion that they should not be 
liable for the full amount of Atlas’ sales because Atlas paid them only a 
percentage as a royalty.  Equity may require a defendant to restore his 
victims to the status quo where the loss suffered is greater than the 
defendant’s unjust enrichment.  Moreover, because the FTC Act is 
designed to protect consumers from economic injuries, courts have often 
awarded the full amount lost by consumers rather than limiting damages 
to a defendant’s profits.  Stefanchik and Beringer were the driving force 
behind the marketing scheme for the Stefanchik Program, with authority 
to control its key components, and they benefitted significantly from the 
sales induced by material misrepresentations.238 
The Ninth Circuit has lost sight of the fact that its jurisdiction for 
awarding remedies lies in implied jurisdiction to award ancillary remedies 
to injunctive relief; its jurisdiction is not based on the entire FTC Act.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s alarming holding in Stefanchik does not represent a solitary 
leap in logic or legal reasoning, but rather the next "logical" step in a body 
of case opinions that are founded on fundamental error and weak research.  
The case law has progressed to the point that the flaws and errors are not 
apparent until the legal analyst has "drilled down" two or three levels of 
case opinions.  Given the high pressure environment that accompanies the 
FTC tactics of motions for summary judgment, motions in limine,239 and 
minimal standards for causation, it is understandable that inexperienced 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Id. at 926. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 927. 
 238. Id. at 931–32; but see Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 67 
(2d Cir. 2006) ("The appropriate measure of restitution is the benefit unjustly received by the 
defendants. . . .  [R]estitution is measured by the defendant’s gain."). 
 239. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, L.L.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3315, at *2–13 (D. Conn. 2006) (discussing motions to strike and affirmative defenses). 
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defense counsel and many jurists fail to undertake the burden of proving in 
detail where and how the FTC’s paradigm departs from traditional 
understanding and violates accepted boundaries.240  In some cases, 
definitions of key terms get so twisted that orders for gross disgorgement 
are found to comply with the Grupo standard because the Second Circuit 
held that equitable restitution applies and gross disgorgement is a form of 
equitable restitution without considering how the FTC would measure 
them.241  Such opinions are either unaware or neglect to mention that gross 
disgorgement is only an acceptable award of restitution when the defendant 
is found in contempt or the defendant fails to prove her claim for counter-
restitution.242 
The Stefanchik opinion demonstrates three of the key pillars to the 
FTC’s ability to secure disgorgement orders that breach the traditional 
boundaries for monetary remedies in equity and, therefore, exceed the 
federal court’s jurisdiction.  First, the Ninth Circuit and other courts are 
invested in the belief that they have the authority to order consumer redress 
or reimbursement, which is generally based on the prior Ninth Circuit 
opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Figgie International, Inc.,243 
which related to a claim under an alternative section of the FTC Act for 
jurisdiction.244  Second, the Ninth Circuit believes that the FTC’s claims 
allow for what Justice Scalia might call omnipotent authority to render 
justice as required.245  Third, the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have held 
that equitable remedies can be punitive or exemplary.246 
While it is still unusual to see disgorgement awards in excess of the 
defendant’s revenues, awards of the defendant’s revenues are common and 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See supra notes 218–19, 222, 227 and accompanying text (discussing Tull and 
McCaskey). 
 241. See Bronson Partners, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3315, at *12 ("Restitution and 
disgorgement of profits are equitable in nature."); see also id. (holding that with respect to 
restitution and disgorgement, "the court is not awarding damages to which plaintiff is legally 
entitled but is exercising the chancellor’s discretion to prevent unjust enrichment"). 
 242. The author is unaware of any agency case opinions that attempt to justify gross 
disgorgement for a federal agency on the basis of the property law exceptions, as discussed 
in Section VIII. 
 243. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Figgie Intern., Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 607–08 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding inter alia that the seller had liability for misrepresentations, and that part of 
the district courts damages were punitive and therefore prohibited). 
 244. See id.  
 245. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(stating that the court has broad equitable jurisdiction, which includes the ability to make a 
freeze order). 
 246. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (discussing Tull). 
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also outside the court’s jurisdiction.  The aberrant result in Stefanchik and 
unfounded rationale cannot be brushed aside as a solitary outlier.  In less 
than two years, the opinion has been cited or quoted favorably in more than 
eleven cases, including three cases outside of the Ninth Circuit.247  
Therefore, it seems unlikely that Stefanchik will remain an extreme or 
solitary FTC opinion for very long. 
Since at least 1982, the FTC has asserted that its mandate from 
Congress to fight consumer fraud expands a court’s jurisdiction to award 
remedies in equity especially suited for the FTC’s mandate.  Inferring this 
special mandate from a provision that merely provides statutory jurisdiction 
to seek injunctive relief is unwarranted, especially in comparison with 
remedies awarded for agencies with similar implied statutory jurisdiction.  
Such an inference would also run counter to the Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion in Tull,248 which found that the EPA had overstepped its 
jurisdiction in seeking penalties as an ancillary remedy to injunctive relief, 
and Cavanagh,249 which held that a remedy awarded under implied 
jurisdiction must meet the standard handed down in Grupo. 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Singer, however, can be read to be 
compatible with the limitations set down by Tull and Grupo.250  But 
Singer’s pronouncement has progressed and is now frequently repeated 
without any reference to traditional restrictions on the court’s jurisdiction to 
                                                                                                                 
 247. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1141 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. MacGregor, 360 Fed. Appx. 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Trudeau, 579 F.3d 754, 771 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
INC21.com Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98944, at **55 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Dinamica Financiera LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88000, at *37 (C.D. Cal. 
2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Swish Mktg., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47948, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 
2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Publishers Bus. Servs., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34336, at *44 
(D. Nev. 2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Medlab, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 
2009); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Home Assure, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32055, at *10 
(M.D. Fla. 2009); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Med. Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 
310 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 248. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424–25 (1987) (arguing that a court in 
equity may award monetary relief as an adjunct to injunctive relief, but it may not enforce 
civil penalties by characterizing the legal claim as incidental to the equitable relief). 
 249. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 121 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(stating that "federal courts possess authority under the Constitution and Judiciary Act to 
impose equitable remedy of disgorgement"). 
 250. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(stating that the FTC’s objective is to obtain restitution "of moneys fraudulently obtained"); 
see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1982) (discussing the available equitable remedies). 
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order remedies.251  The abbreviated caption from Singer has been cited or 
quoted in more than twenty-five FTC cases since 1982.252 
Relatively few in number, FDA opinions agree with the FTC’s view of 
consumer redress.  The FDA has secured the Sixth Circuit’s approval for 
the proposition that statutory authority for injunctive relief includes 
consumer redress, as that remedy complies with the overarching FDA 
                                                                                                                 
 251. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1141 (9th 
Cir. 2010) ("The FTC Act endows the district court with broad authority to ‘grant any 
ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice,’ including the power to compel the 
payment of restitution to injured consumers."); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 
924, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[B]ecause the FTC Act is designed to protect consumers from 
economic injuries, courts have often awarded the full amount lost by consumers rather than 
limiting damages to a defendant’s profits."); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 
1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994)) ("[T]he authority granted by Section 13(b) is not limited to the 
power to issue an injunction; rather, it includes the ‘authority to grant any ancillary relief 
necessary to accomplish complete justice.’  This power includes the power to order 
restitution.") (citing Singer, 668 F.2d at 1113); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. RCA Credit Servs., 
LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73461, at **36–40 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing restitution 
amounts paid by customers). 
 252. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1141 (9th Cir. 
2010); Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 680 (9th Cir. 
2007); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. MTK Mktg., 149 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sec. 
Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314 (8th Cir. 1991); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. World 
Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1988); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
INC21.com Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98944, at **82 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 202, 212 (D. Mass. 2009); Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. J.K. Publs., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36885, at *14 (C.D. Cal. 2009); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 285, 307–8 (D. Mass. 
2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Med. Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 323 
(S.D.N.Y 2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Natural Solution, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
60783, at *18 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Connelly, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
98263, at *47 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 335 F. Supp. 2d 
479, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Consumer Alliance, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17423, at *22 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Crescent Publ’g Grp., Inc., 
129 F. Supp. 2d 311, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Five-Star Auto Club, 
Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 502, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Arlington Press, Inc., 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2055, at *25 (C.D. Cal. 1999); In re National Credit Mgmt. Group, 
LLC, 21 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 n.3 (D.N.J. 1998); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Hang-Ups Art 
Enters., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21444, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Silueta Distribs., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22254, at *23 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. ENGAGE-A-CAR SERVS., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16357, *6 (D.N.J. 1986); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1280, 1281 (D. Minn. 1985); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Int’l Diamond Corp./Full Serv. Import Brokers, Inc., 1983 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15504, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1983). 
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statutory scheme because "it serves goals of the FDC that are encompassed 
within the section the FDA charges Appellants violated."253 
The analysis of FTC gross disgorgement claims is complicated by the 
fact that the FTC’s statutes include two key applicable provisions that have 
been used to justify monetary remedies in equity.  Section 13(b) of the FTC 
Act provides the FTC with authority for injunctive relief,254 while Section 
19 authorizes the FTC to make more specific remedial claims, including 
claims based on damages to the victims or customers of the defendants.255  
Peter Ward points out that claims under Section 13(b) are easier to make 
than claims under Section 19 because Section 19 requires the FTC to 
complete administrative proceedings before initiating civil litigation.256  Of 
course, the result has been for the FTC to prefer litigation under Section 
13(b) rather than a combination of administrative law and litigation under 
Section 19.  According to a statement on the FTC website, most of the 
FTC’s consumer protection enforcement activities are now conducted in 
litigation rather than administrative proceedings.257 
Over time, the FTC has sought and been awarded monetary remedies 
based on customer redress.  The Ninth Circuit opinion in Figgie is often 
cited in opinions that award customer redress under Section 13, although 
generally without any specific acknowledgement that Figgie was based on 
Section 19.258  The FTC is securing special remedies provided in Section 19 
                                                                                                                 
 253. United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 763 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 254. See FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (2006) ("Upon properly showing a 
temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted . . . ."). 
 255. See id. § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2006) ("Such relief may include, but shall not be 
limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, 
the payment of damages, and public notification respecting the rule violation or the unfair or 
deceptive act or practice . . . ."). 
 256. See Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act:  Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 
1191–92 (1992). 
 257. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing the FTC’s 2010 annual 
report). 
 258. Inexplicably, a number of opinions about the FTC’s claims under Section 13(b) 
are justified in part by citing the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Federal Trade Commision v. 
Figgie International, 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993), which was a case based on jurisdiction 
under Section 19.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Munoz, 17 Fed. App’x 624, 626–27 (9th Cir. 
2001); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6192, at 
*38 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 564 n.6 
(D. Md. 2005); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 
1019 (N.D. Ind. 2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Commonwealth Mktg. Grp., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 
2d 530, 544 (W.D. Pa. 1999); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cyberspace.com, L.L.C., 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25565, at *13 n.5 (W.D. Wash. 2002); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 1263523 Ont., 
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but with the procedural ease of Section 13.  At a minimum, the award of 
consumer redress, based on compensating the plaintiffs’ losses, violates the 
holdings in Grupo and Tull as outside of traditional remedies in equity and 
as a punitive remedy, respectively.  In addition, a recent opinion from the 
Federal Circuit rejected such a practice in relation to the award of a 
disgorgement remedy awarded under the Racketeer Influences and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO) statute: 
Congress’ intent when it drafted RICO’s remedies would be 
circumvented by the Government’s broad reading of its § 1964(a) 
remedies.  The disgorgement requested here is similar in effect to the 
relief mandated under the criminal forfeiture provision, § 1963(a), 
without requiring the inconvenience of meeting the additional 
procedural safeguards that attend criminal charges, including a five-year 
statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282, notice requirements, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1963(l), and general criminal procedural protections including proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Further, on the Government’s view it can 
collect sums paralleling—perhaps exactly—the damages available to 
individual victims under § 1964(c).259 
It would be impossible to definitively prove that the failure in court 
opinions to acknowledge the distinction between Sections 13 and 19 had a 
significant impact on the exact nature of the holding.  According to my 
count, in about half of the FTC cases that cite Figgie and that address 
Section 13 of the FTC Act (twenty-nine out of fifty-three cases), Section 19 
was not mentioned.260  Over time, the problem gets to be sheer numbers of 
                                                                                                                 
Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Under the FTC Act, the Court has the 
power to ‘grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers’ 
resulting from deceptive acts or practices.’" (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Figgie Int’l, 
Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 1993))); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think All Publ’g, LLC, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18623, at *6 (E.D. Tex. 2008). 
 259. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200–01 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 260. Cases that cited Figgie without referring to Section 19 of the FTC Act include:  
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2009); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Cyberspace.com, LLC, 453 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom 
Commc’ns., Inc., 401 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Munoz, 17 Fed. 
Appx. 624 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Trudeau, 606 F.3d 382 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Dinamica Financiera LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88000 (C.D. Cal. 
2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. RCA Credit Servs., LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73461 
(M.D. Fl. 2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Trudeau, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37924 (N.D. Ill. 
2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Conn. 2009); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Home Assure, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32053 (M.D. Fla. 2009); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. City West Advantage, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71608 (D. Nev. 
2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Ga. 
2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Natural Solution, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60783 (C.D. 
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similar cases with a similar mistake and the fact that a reader of the third 
generation of mistakes has no idea of the omission. 
Recently, the Tenth Circuit overturned an award of sanctions against 
the FTC, finding that the FTC claims were colorable and did not warrant 
sanctions.261  As part of that opinion, the Tenth Circuit stated that the FTC 
was free to seek consumer redress based on the following rationale: 
Section 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), provides the remedy for a § 5 
violation.  Although § 13(b) does not expressly authorize a court to 
grant consumer redress (i.e., refund, restitution, rescission, or other 
equitable monetary relief), § 13(b)’s grant of authority to provide 
injunctive relief carries with it the full range of equitable remedies, 
including the power to grant consumer redress.  In cases where the FTC 
seeks injunctive relief, courts deem any monetary relief sought as 
incidental to injunctive relief.262 
                                                                                                                 
Cal. 2007); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Emerald Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67947 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
White Pine Trust Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27218 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25173 (D. Wash. 2007); United States v. 
Prochnow, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92895 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Connelly, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98263 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Voc. Guides, Inc., 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82308 (M.D. Tenn. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, 
LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3315 (D. Conn. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Peoples Credit 
First, LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38545 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2005), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded by Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. 
Corp., 531 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 373 F. 
Supp. 2d 558 (D. Md. 2005); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accent Mktg., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12545 (D. Ala. 2002); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gill, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (C.D. Cal. 
2001); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Para-Link Int’l, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21509 (M.D. Fla. 
2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (N.D. Ind. 
2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Five-Star Auto Club, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Solomon Trading Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19696 (D. Az. 
1994); Samson v. Schmersey (In re Schmersey), 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3089 (Bankr. Mont. 
2005); Mishkin v. Ensminger (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 
404 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 261. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1207–08 
(10th Cir. 2005) (stating that the FTC could have reasonably concluded that facts might be 
established to justify both injunctive relief and consumer redress and holding that the district 
court abused its discretion by finding the allegations to be frivolous and groundless). 
 262. See id. at 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch. 
Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468–69 (11th Cir. 1996); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pantron I Corp., 33 
F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994).  See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 
767 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating the three-part formula for calculating redress for consumer 
injury); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384 (D. Conn. 
2009) ("Payments the defendants made to third parties are not allowable offsets as a matter 
of law, nor are net profits the appropriate measure of restitution."); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
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The Tenth Circuit overlooked its own opinion, issued one year earlier in 
Callery v. United States Insurance Co.,263 that "though the issue is close, we 
must adhere to the Supreme Court’s rather emphatic guidance and therefore 
conclude that in a suit by a beneficiary against a fiduciary, the beneficiary 
may not be awarded compensatory damages as ‘appropriate equitable 
relief’ under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA."264 
Despite an impressive list of precedents to the contrary,265 two circuit 
opinions state that punitive remedies for FTC claims do not exceed a 
court’s authority under Section 13(b).266  To be sure, punitive remedies 
under Section 13 are not in violation of Section 19, but they are in violation 
of Grupo and several other Supreme Court precedents.  The Second Circuit 
opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur, which is the foundation for most federal 
agency claims under implied jurisdiction, clearly acknowledged this 
limitation.267 
Section 4 of the Third Restatement provides some frank 
acknowledgments of the fact that terms like restitution, among others, have 
been twisted and contorted to justify a remedy that a traditional court in 
                                                                                                                 
Nat’l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1215 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (arguing that 
injunctive relief may be broader than the violations alleged so long as the relief is reasonably 
related to the FTC Act violations that occurred); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Seismic Entm’t 
Prods., 441 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (D.N.H. 2006) ("‘The appropriate measure for restitution is 
the benefit unjustly received by the defendants.’  That amount need not be reduced to the 
amount of a defendant’s profits from the illegal activities.") (citations omitted); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Atlantex Assocs., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10911, at *36–37 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ("It 
is an appropriate remedy authorized by this Court’s equitable powers to require the 
individual and corporate Defendants to pay consumer redress in the form of a cash refund 
measured by amounts previously paid less any amounts returned to consumers . . . ."). 
 263. See Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401, 409 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding inter 
alia that ERISA provision barred claim for payment of proceeds of life insurance policy 
covering employee’s former husband, that the employee could not seek relief under ERISA 
in the form of equitable estoppel, and that ERISA’s limitation did not foreclose all remedies 
to employee). 
 264. Id. 
 265. See supra notes 118–22, 160 and accompanying text (discussing punitive 
damages).  
 266. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997) 
("Additionally, Febre and Ace argue that such disgorgement amounts to a penalty that 
exceeds the authority of the court as provided by Section 13(b) of the Fed. Trade Comm’n.  
They cite the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in [Figgie] in support of this assertion."); see also Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 267. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d 
Cir. 1971) ("Thus we hold that the SEC may seek other than injunctive relief in order to 
effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a 
penalty assessment."). 
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equity could not recognize.268  The misuse of terms, knowing or otherwise, 
like "restitution" is part of the high art of rationalizing a remedy that stands 
out in comparison to remedy measures for other federal agency or IP 
claims.  Whether the remedy is labeled as restitution,269 disgorgement,270 
consumer redress,271 refund,272 or reimbursement,273 the remedy awarded 
amounts to gross disgorgement.  At most, the cases in this area recite that 
disgorgement or restitution is an equitable remedy and fail to look beneath 
the label.274  For example, the opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. 
Febre275 is frequently cited to support gross disgorgement276 yet the holding 
                                                                                                                 
 268. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. a 
(2011) ("The chameleon-like qualities of the term ‘restitution’ permit its invocation in a 
variety of circumstances where the legal and equitable nature of a given remedy may not be 
apparent."). 
 269. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1021 
(N.D. Ind. 2000) (referring to the damages awarded as "restitution"). 
 270. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Medicor, L.L.C., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1058 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) ("Section 13(b) of the FTC Act permits the Court to order disgorgement 
regardless of the amount of the defendant’s profits.  The full amount lost by consumers is an 
appropriate measure of damages." (citations omitted)). 
 271. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Atlantex Assocs., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10911, at 
*36 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ("The court . . . finds that sufficient facts have been presented to 
warrant granting relief for consumer redress which resulted from the defendants’ violations 
of the Act."). 
 272. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Int’l Diamond Corp., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15504, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (referring to the remedy for commercial redress as a "refund"). 
 273. See United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2005) 
("[T]he restitution sought by the government here is reimbursement . . . ."). 
 274. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373, 378 (D. 
Conn. 2009) (stating that in Verity "the Second Circuit assumed without deciding that 
restitution is available as ancillary equitable relief under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act and 
held that the availability of ancillary equitable relief under Section 13(b) derives from the 
district court’s equitable jurisdiction"). 
 275. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding inter 
alia that the FTC could use defendant’s database data to calculate damages, which could be 
awarded based on consumer losses rather than defendant’s profits, and disgorgement of 
illegally obtained funds was justified).  
 276. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Febre and stating that "because the FTC Act is designed to protect consumers from 
economic injuries, courts have often awarded the full amount lost by consumers rather than 
limiting damages to a defendant’s profits"); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. INC21.com Corp., 745 
F. Supp. 2d 975, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ("The FTC Act was designed to protect consumers 
from economic injuries.  As such, courts have often awarded restitution in the full amount of 
funds lost by consumers rather than limiting restitution solely to a defendant’s profits."); 
Bronson Partners, 674 F. at 384 (citing Febre and stating that "the amount of actual profit 
that the defendants may realize is not relevant, and if the defendants lose money engaging in 
prohibited conduct there is no bar to restitution"); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Davison Assocs., 
COUNTER-RESTITUTION 1325 
in Febre for the award of gross disgorgement is specifically justified on the 
defendants’ failure to present significant evidence of counter-restitution.277  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit opinion in United 
States v. Universal Management Services, Inc.278 also relies on profit 
disgorgement cases to justify gross disgorgement.  Note how the Sixth 
Circuit avoids defining a punitive remedy and then resorts to sympathy for 
the consumer: 
Appellants also claim that restitution is punitive because, unlike 
disgorgement which removes ill-gotten gain by forcing surrender of 
profits, restitution requires a return of the entire purchase price, included 
in which are costs and profits.  See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 
1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The purpose of disgorgement is not to 
compensate the victims of the fraud, but to deprive the wrongdoer of his 
ill-gotten gain.").  See also SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 
F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978).  Simply because disgorgement and 
restitution are different, however, does not make restitution punitive.  
See SEC v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[W]hile disgorgement has been 
said to serve more important interests than the compensation of 
investors, that principle is a far cry from the proposition that restitution 
is an improper end." (internal citation omitted)).  Appellants, who 
disobeyed the law, should not have his expenses covered by consumers.  
To say that restitution is unavailable is to say that consumers must cover 
the costs of Appellants’ production, advertising, and illegal distribution.  
Instead, the district court should have the discretion in a case such as 
                                                                                                                 
431 F. Supp. 2d 548, 560 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Febre and stating that "the authority to 
grant permanent injunction includes the authority to order any other ancillary equitable relief 
necessary to effectuate the exercise of powers granted under [S]ection 13(b) [of the FTC 
ACT]"); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Seismic Entm’t Prods., 441 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (D.N.H. 
2006) ("The appropriate measure for restitution is the benefit unjustly received by the 
defendants.  That amount need not be reduced to the amount of defendant’s profits from 
illegal activities.") (citations omitted); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Medicor, L.L.C., 217 F. Supp. 
2d 1048, 1057–58 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Febre and stating that "Section 13(b) of the FTC 
Act permits the Court to order disgorgement regardless of the amount of the defendant’s 
profits. . . .  The full amount lost by consumers is an appropriate measure of damages."); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Five-Star Auto Club, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 502, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(citing Febre and stating that "the proper amount of relief is the full amount lost by 
consumers"). 
 277. See Febre, 128 F.3d at 536 ("[T]here was no abuse of discretion in awarding 
$16,096,345 in damages where the amount was properly supported in the record and 
defendants failed to dispute the facts in a timely and appropriate manner."). 
 278. See United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 764 (6th Cir. 
1999) (holding inter alia that in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act precludes a court to sit in 
equity from ordering restitution in appropriate cases and the order was appropriate in this 
case). 
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this to make the consumers whole rather than allow the illegal activities 
to stand uncorrected to the consumer’s detriment.279 
Each of the three cases cited within is briefly quoted to show that whoever 
wrote the opinion should have been aware that he or she was justifying 
oranges with apples.  Furthermore, in at least two of the cited cases, the 
opinion advised that disgorgement orders are not intended to compensate 
the plaintiff or provide consumer redress.  Apparently the Court must have 
believed that it could order the disgorgement of profits or restitution of 
revenues but not disgorgement of revenues.280 
The FTC is not the only plaintiff that faces "outlaws."  Some of the 
defendants in these cases are bad actors:  Not as bad as Bernie Madoff or 
Blake, but serious fraud-feasors.  For example, the product being marketed 
in Universal Management was a treatment device for arthritis.281  The 
patient was told to apply the device against her bare skin and pull the 
trigger to administer a light shock.282  The devices were sold for $88.30 and 
were totally ineffective.  The defendant paid about $1 for each device as 
they were surplus charcoal grill starters.283  On the other hand, there was an 
equally bad actor who was the target of a disgorgement order for selling 
defective prosthetic devices that broke easily after insertion.284  The latter 
was a trademark case in which the defendant’s right to counter-restitution 
was not in dispute.285 
                                                                                                                 
 279. Universal Mgmt., 191 F.3d at 764–65. 
 280. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 
(2d Cir. 1978) ("Defendants complain that the court’s computation of profits and losses 
ended on . . . the last trading day before the SEC suspended trading in BL securities; that 
they still held substantial amounts of such securities at that time; and that losses after trading 
was resumed wiped out any profits."); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 
(5th Cir. 1978) ("The court’s power to order disgorgement extends only to the amount with 
interest by which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing.  Any further sum would 
constitute a penalty assessment."); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F. 
Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Under the circumstances 
of this case, however, Norbay should not be required to disgorge any more than the profit it 
made . . . ."). 
 281. Universal Mgmt., 191 F.3d at 764. 
 282. Id. at 755. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See World Wide Prosthetic Supply, Inc. v. Mikulsky, 640 N.W.2d 764, 765–66 
(Wis. 2002) (stating that although the business relationship ceased due to manufacturing 
defects, the manufacturer continued to sell the prosthetic components without making 
changes to their appearance or design). 
 285. See id. (providing the underlying facts of the case). 
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The FTC does not limit its claims to fraud or misrepresentation.  The 
FTC’s mandate is so broad and its causation standard so low that it can 
make claims for damaged consumers alleging negligence, an unintentional 
tort.286  The remedies for these defendants are no different from the other 
FTC cases.  Consider a recent Ninth Circuit opinion relating to a failed 
company that tried to provide a service for delivering checks by e-mail.287  
The system did not work well and, in hindsight, it proved to be a target-rich 
environment for third-party fraud.288  Third parties gained access to the 
system and sent unauthorized checks on accounts registered on the 
system.289  The e-mail service did not work and security was undoubtedly 
weak, but there is no indication that the defendants were parties to the 
fraud.290  The Ninth Circuit advises that neither deceptive intent nor 
knowledge of the harm from a third party’s acts is required for a successful 
FTC claim: 
These cases illustrate that businesses can cause direct consumer harm as 
contemplated by the FTC Act in a variety of ways.  In assessing that 
harm, we look of course to the deceptive nature of the practice, but the 
absence of deceit is not dispositive.  Nor is actual knowledge of the 
harm a requirement under the Act.  Courts have long held that 
consumers are injured for purposes of the Act not solely through the 
machinations of those with ill intentions, but also through the actions of 
those whose practices facilitate, or contribute to, ill intentioned schemes 
if the injury was a predictable consequence of those actions.291 
                                                                                                                 
 286. See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader:  Consumer Protection and the Regulation of 
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 676–77 (1977) ("[I]ssues of . . . causality relating to 
whether consumers were influenced in purchasing decisions by the false claim are largely 
avoided by the Commission rules that it need show only capacity to deceive rather than 
actual deception, and capacity to affect purchasing decisions rather than actual effects."). 
 287. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that the software allowed registered user to create and send checks by post or email); 
see also id. at 1156 (discussing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Windward Mktg., Ltd., 1997 WL 
33642380 (N.D. Ga. 1997), and stating that the court found defendant liable because it 
"facilitated and provided substantial assistance to [a] . . . deceptive scheme," resulting in 
substantial injury to consumers). 
 288. See id. at 1154 ("The . . . system was highly vulnerable to con artists and 
fraudsters."). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 1159; see also id. at 1157 ("[Defendant] engaged in behavior that was, itself, 
injurious to consumers.  [Defendant’s] business practices might have served to assist others 
in illicit or deceptive schemes, but the liability under the FTC Act that attaches to 
[defendant] is not mediated by the actions of those third parties."). 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s 
right to present evidence of counter-restitution: 
Analogizing to securities law, the district court concluded that the 
appropriate measure of equitable disgorgement was Neovi’s total 
revenue.  See SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1113 
(9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "the district court has broad equity 
powers to order the disgorgement of ‘ill-gotten gains’ obtained through 
the violation of federal securities laws") (internal citations omitted).  An 
evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because there were no "genuine 
issues of material fact remaining in the case."  [Defendant] argues that 
this conclusion was error in that "the FTC did not put forth admissible 
evidence demonstrating that Neovi realized $535,358 in ‘ill gotten 
gains.’"  The district court derived this specific figure from the gross 
receipts on Neovi’s tax return, the details of which were not disputed.  
[Defendant] argues that the figure is invalid because [defendant’s] 
revenues were exceeded by developing, maintenance, and operating 
costs for the software and website.292 
The upshot of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Neovi is that defendants are 
being assessed disgorgement awards that are more severe than the remedies 
provided in Section 51 of the Third Restatement even though many of these 
defendants do not constitute willful infringers.  The FTC does not have to 
prove the defendant’s intent or even her knowledge of the harmful impact.  
Under such circumstances, Section 51 would not justify even the 
disgorgement of profits let alone the disgorgement of revenues.293 
A case opinion in 2008 from the Eleventh Circuit provides mixed 
indications of the ability of the federal circuit courts to resolve this problem 
by themselves.294  The case is unusual because it directly acknowledges the 
fact that claims for the CFTC and FTC are based on exactly the same 
jurisdiction and rationale in Porter.295  Next, it held that the district court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 292. Id. at 1159–60; see also id. at 1160 ("It is unclear what facts could be uncovered at 
an evidentiary hearing that [defendant] did not have the opportunity to present to the district 
court.  In any case, as the FTC points out, the disputed points appear to be questions of law, 
not of fact."). 
 293. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (2011) 
(defining "conscious wrongdoer" and providing that conscious wrongdoers are liable for net 
profits attributable to the underlying wrong). 
 294. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 531 F.3d 
1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (vacating the award of restitution and remanding this case to 
reduce the amount of restitution granted for the defendant’s misrepresentation and affirming 
the awarding of civil penalties and injunctive relief). 
 295. Id. at 1343–44. 
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order for restitution in the amount of customer losses was outside its 
equitable powers: 
The equitable remedy of restitution does not take into consideration the 
plaintiff’s losses, but only focuses on the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment. . . .  Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused 
its discretion in awarding the full amount of customer losses.  The 
proper measurement is the amount that Appellants wrongfully gained by 
their misrepresentations.296 
However, two subsequent opinions from district courts in the Eleventh 
Circuit acknowledged the opinion but rejected the defendants’ claim that 
the Eleventh Circuit opinion precludes consumer redress.  The U.S. District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida chose to interpret the Eleventh 
Circuit opinion as similar to the Second Circuit opinion in Verity, which 
rejected measuring a monetary remedy against a wholesaler as the retail 
revenues, as opposed to the Ninth Circuit opinion in Stepanchik.297  It seems 
difficult to misunderstand the Eleventh Circuit’s intent, although it would 
have been helpful if that opinion had reversed the parts of its prior opinion 
that endorsed punitive damages and awarded consumer redress.298  A 
second district court opinion in Florida, however, avers that the opinion 
does not "unambiguously demonstrate an intent to alter the available 
equitable remedy in a statutory enforcement action."299 
The ability of the FTC and FDA in particular to secure measures of 
disgorgement that are significantly outside the mainstream of unjust 
enrichment in equity is disquieting.  This is especially true for decisions 
that hold or imply that reimbursement or disgorgement of revenues or gross 
proceeds is a remedy in equity that is appropriate, traditional, or both.  
Equally disturbing is the ease with which federal courts ignore the 
boundaries set by the Supreme Court on remedies in equity and the 
authoritative discussion available in the Restatements.300 
                                                                                                                 
 296. Id. (citations omitted); see also id. at 1345 ("The Third Circuit has concluded that 
an award of restitution under § 13a-1 measured in the amount of customer losses is generally 
improper."). 
 297. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. RCA Credit Servs., LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
73461, at *37–40 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing relief under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act). 
 298. See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 
1996). 
 299. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Home Assure, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32055, at 
*11 n.9 (M.D. Fla. 2009); see also id. at *12 ("Additionally, an unmistakable (although 
imperfect) resemblance exists between (i) consumer redress in the amount of gross revenues 
and (ii) traditional money damages."). 
 300. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 (2002) 
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Advocates for the federal courts might claim that the semantics of 
restitution are confusing and difficult to master and that courts are easily 
misled about how the terms should be applied.  However, simple word 
searches in electronic databases indicate that published FTC case opinions 
make almost no mention of the First or Third Restatement.  
Consider the following search results:  (1) In the last twenty years the 
Federal Trade Commission was named as a party in 869 federal cases and 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission was named in 655 federal 
cases; (2) For the agency subgroups of 869 and 655 cases, the First or Third 
Restatements were cited in only one case in each subgroup (by contrast, the 
First or Third Restatements were cited in a total of 966 federal cases in the 
last twenty years.); and (3) Dan Dobbs’ authoritative treatise on remedies 
and Palmers treatise on restitution also had only one cite each for the 
Federal Trade Commission subgroup.301  While the contrast in numbers is 
stark, it may not justify the conclusion that the courts are willfully ignoring 
the Supreme Court’s boundaries or the counsel of the Restatements.  
However, it does suggest that the courts are disconnected and unwilling to 
seek out persuasive authority on their own. 
In the meantime, the FTC and FDA approach is being applied to a 
wider area of the substantive law.  A few cases outside of federal agency 
litigation already cite agency cases on restitution.302  The FTC and FDA 
also aim to apply their disgorgement remedies beyond fraud.  The FTC has 
announced plans to initiate disgorgement remedies in anti-trust cases,303 and 
the FDA has already secured a number of huge settlements from 
                                                                                                                 
("Rarely will there be need for any more ‘antiquarian inquiry’ . . . than consulting, as we 
have done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, 
which make the answer clear."); see also Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 
356, 362 (2006) (discussing Knudson); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance 
Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (debating whether a preliminary injunction was 
relied traditionally accorded by courts of equity). 
 301. The data were the result of an informal and somewhat unsophisticated case search 
conducted on the LEXIS database.  Agency subgroups were identified by searching for all 
cases in which the agency was included as a named party. 
 302. So far, this happens only on rare occasions.  See MJAC Consulting, Inc. v. Barrett, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49944, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 874 
A.2d 919, 947–48 (Md. 2005) (citing an FTC case); Dixon v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11992, at *10 n.19 (E.D. La. 1998) (citing Febre). 
 303. See Stephen Calkins, Civil Monetary Remedies Available to Federal Antitrust 
Enforcers, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 567, 569 (2006) (discussing the FTC’s use of Section 13(b) of 
the FTC Act to obtain civil monetary antitrust remedies). 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers by avoiding disgorgement claims based on 
the manufacturer’s alleged failure to follow FDA production standards.304   
X.  Conclusion 
Courts in equity, as well as the law of restitution and unjust 
enrichment, have the potential to keep pace with massive changes in the 
business and government environment for the purposes of offering 
advantageous and even unique remedies to corporate litigation.  
Technological change and the increasing importance of exotic forms of 
intangible wealth will only make monetary remedies in equity more 
relevant and applicable in the future.  We are now prepared to respond to 
any interloping doctor at our next bar convention! 
The case law from the nineteenth century is useful because it provides 
a snapshot of principles in equity before the federal government altered 
them in IP legislation.  As a comparison for agency remedies, it also 
provides a useful reference for remedies awarded on the same basis of 
implied jurisdiction.  With some exceptions, the snapshot reveals that key 
principles for the measure of monetary remedies in equity have not 
significantly changed even though the rationale may have been mislaid. 
Similar to many of the points raised by Professor Rounds’ article, this 
Article provides examples of the influence of trust law on the law of 
restitution and unjust enrichment.305  The rationale for some of the 
applicable trust law warrants more attention, if only to improve our 
understanding of the underlying rationale for parts of the law of restitution 
and unjust enrichment and to state and define that law more accurately.  
Identifying this connection would be integral to promoting greater 
awareness of the commonality of monetary remedies in equity to many 
areas of substantive law that otherwise may have been thought to be 
independent. 
                                                                                                                 
 304. See Eric M. Blumberg, Universal Management, Abbot, Wyeth, Schering-Plough, 
and . . . :  Restitution and Disgorgement Find Another Home at the Food and Drug 
Administration, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169, 170 (2003) (discussing the FDA’s plans to make 
claims for restitution against defendants that offer unapproved products as well as seek 
claims against established pharmaceutical companies for "significant violations of current 
good manufacturing practice (CGMP) requirements").  According to this article, the FDA 
has already secured significant results in substantial consent decrees (Abbott, $100 million; 
Wyeth, $30 million; Schering-Plough, $500 million) for violation of CGMP.  Id. at 170–71. 
 305. See, e.g., Rounds, supra note 36, at 336–51 (discussing trust law’s influence on IP 
infringement mediation). 
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The defendant to a claim for unjust enrichment deserves an 
opportunity to prove her counter-restitution.  Such a due process right is 
fully supported by existing case law and authoritative treatises.  Aside from 
limited property cases, gross disgorgement as a matter of law is relatively 
rare and most of those cases can be explained public policy or equitable 
discretion.  Agency cases flout the proposed rule with seeming impunity at 
least in the Ninth Circuit.  Even when plaintiffs are entitled to gross 
disgorgement as a matter of fact or based on the defendant’s default, almost 
half of the courts provide for some form of counter-restitution. 
The standard for measuring indemnity for a trustee in default, 
assessing the benefit of the proposed counter-restitution, is already applied 
in a significant portion of cases relating to willful defendants and appears to 
be the modern standard for considering the services or labor of the 
defendant.  Combined with exceptions for infringing expenses and other 
counter-restitution considered prejudicial to public policy, the benefit 
standard is simpler to understand and could prove sufficiently flexible to 
permit many of the fact patterns in the past that have demanded gross 
disgorgement as a matter of fact. 
The FTC’s mandate includes some reprehensible defendants.  The 
sympathy of a court is unmistakable when it justifies gross disgorgement as 
a matter of law by asking why it would be fair or right for the court to allow 
the defendant counter-restitution for business expenses when the plaintiff 
was cheated.306  The short answer is that the court only has jurisdiction to 
award equitable remedies—not remedies that necessarily seem "fair" or 
"right."  The long answer is that when counter-restitution is not necessarily 
excluded, it is unlikely that very much counter-restitution will escape 
elimination after discounting the plaintiff’s counter-restitution for the 
benefit to the plaintiff and eliminating all expenses that offend public 
policy.  The FTC also has other choices:  it can pursue the claim under 
Section 19 or Congress can provide statutory authority for what is a remedy 
at law.  Punitive damage remedies awarded to government "prosecutors" in 
a process that denies counter-restitution as a matter of law better resemble 
remedies at law and therefore violate the spirit of the Seventh Amendment 
to the U.S Constitution. 
                                                                                                                 
 306. See Secs. Exch. Comm’n v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934 
(S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983) ("In any event, however limited the SEC’s 
prior use of disgorgement, it is a remedy that gives courts flexibility to adjust the punishment 
for securities violations to fit the wrongful conduct and to accomplish Congress’ 
objectives."). 
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This Article does not suggest that perfectly clear definitions or simple 
statements of the law would prevent the current state of FTC case law.  The 
FTC does not seek simplicity or clarity and the courts neglect the source of 
their jurisdiction and the need for third-party authority like the 
Restatements.  The FTC is currently pursuing Section 13 as a short-cut to 
avoid the more burdensome alternative of Section 19.  Absent a firm 
reversal in the Supreme Court or legislative action in Congress, however, 
the gross disgorgement agency cases may remain unchecked and thereby 
add confusion and contradiction to a body of law that already has a 
sufficient inventory of both. 
  

